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Research on the perception of time has focused on isolating an internal time keeping mechanism. 
This focus has caused research in this domain to stay focused on perceptual mechanisms. 
However, information that has been perceived must also be stored into memory. The dominant 
model of time perception, SET, specifies a clock stage, a memory stage, and a decision stage 
(Gibbon, 1977), but there has been comparatively more research focusing on the internal clock 
than on memory mechanisms. This dissertation focuses on the memory for time by incorporating 
manipulations used in non-temporal memory research into timing tasks. Chapter 1 targets 
working memory for time and shows that brief delays between learning and recall cause 
temporal estimates to lengthen. Chapter 2 targets retention and storage of multiple time intervals 
over a delay of a few minutes and shows that the estimates of target times learned together will 
migrate towards each other in memory. We also showed that scalar variability arises at retrieval. 
Chapter 3 attempts to reconfigure a categorization task to target implicit memory for time. 
Overall, the research demonstrates that exploring memory mechanisms for time will increase our 
understanding of time perception and provide us with information that focusing on the internal 
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Think of time, not as something that is lost or spent, but as a companion that reminds us to 
cherish every moment, because it will never come again. 
 
Interval timing is the branch of psychology that focuses on the study of the perception 
and estimation of arbitrary intervals of time.  It speaks to our experiences of time flying while 
having fun, or why a watched pot never boils.  When our impatience increases as a webpage 
doesn’t load or a subway train doesn’t arrive, we use our ability to time arbitrary intervals to 
know that we’ve waited long enough.  
 Interval timing in human participants can be assessed using a variety to tasks, which 
break down into three major task types, discrimination, reproduction, and verbal estimation. 
Discrimination tasks present a standard interval with a visual, auditory, or tactile cue.  A second 
interval is presented (typically in the same modality) and participants must decide if the second 
interval is the same, longer, or shorter than the standard. In a reproduction task, an interval is 
presented to subjects via a visual, auditory, or tactile cue and participants are required to 
reproduce the interval by marking it with a key press.  Sometimes participants are required to 
produce an interval presented via a verbal label (e.g. 3 seconds) and this is typically called 
production instead of reproduction.  In the last major task type, verbal estimation, participants 
are presented with a duration using visual, auditory, or tactile cues and must provide a verbal 
estimate of the duration. The first two chapters use a reproduction task, although much of the 
relevant literature uses discrimination tasks. The final chapter uses a discrimination task.  
 The distinction between temporal reproduction and discrimination can be thought of 
analogously to the distinction between recall and recognition memory in non-temporal domains. 




target. For example, after being presented with a list of words, participants must generate a list 
containing the words they remember from the list. Recognition tasks, in contrast, will require 
participants to view an alternate list of words and choose the words that they remember from the 
first list. These distinctions assume that recall tasks require more effort. Since a temporal 
reproduction task requires participants to retrieve a memory of the target time for reproduction, 
we assumed that it was analogous to a memory recall task. In contrast, in temporal 
discrimination tasks participants are provided with alternate durations and they must remember if 
it was the one they had seen before.  
The core concepts for a model of temporal information processing are a clock, a memory 
store, and a decision processor (Church, 2006; Grondin, 2005, Nobre, O’Reilly, 2004; Treisman, 
1963).  There are other proposed models of time perception, which may better reflect 
neurological processes involved in time perception, such as the oscillator model in which an 
oscillation of a mean period represents the time duration in the memory store and may account 
for the internal clock mechanism (Matell & Meck, 2004; Treisman, et al., 1990) or the multiple 
time scale model in which the decay of a memory trace represents the time duration (Staddon & 
Higa, 1999).  However, throughout this paper, I will focus on the internal clock model and 
specifically scalar expectancy theory (SET; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984) 
because it provides a clear metaphor that facilitates the explanation of data (Macar & Vidal, 
2009).  
The internal clock, which has also been called a counter or a pacemaker, is an internal 
timekeeping device that generates a countable rate of pulses. Time is measured by the number of 
pulses that accumulate in the accumulator during a specific interval (Fig. 1). The number of 




increase in clock rate would increase pulse count.  For example, increases in arousal are known 
to increase estimates, likely through the increase of clock rate (Fetterman & Killeen, 1995; 
Meck, 1996; Penton-Voak, et al., 1996; Treisman, et al., 1990; Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995). 
Likewise, boredom has been has been suggested as a cause for decreases in estimates, likely 
because of lower levels of arousal, and therefore, decreased clock rate (Wearden, et al., 1999). 
 
 
Figure 1: The pacemaker (clock/timer) emits pulses at a given rate which pass through an 
attention modulated gate/switch and accumulate in an accumulator. The memory stage is 
represented by a short-term memory store and a long-term memory store. At the decision stage, 
accumulated information is compared to representation(s) in memory leading to a behavior.  
 
The number of accumulated pulses can also be affected by the amount of attention 
directed towards time such that an increase in attention increases pulse count (Brown, 1997, 




modulated gate (Zakay & Block, 1996; Zakay, 1998), or switch (Lejeune, 1998), or both (Zakay 
& Block, 1997). The gate and switch predict separate effects of attention on time estimation. 
Thinking of attention as a spotlight, the gate is the size of the beam; the larger the beam, the 
more area covered in light, and more pulses accumulate. In contrast, the switch in SET is the 
on/off switch of the spotlight; the latency for turning it on will affect the number of pulses that 
accumulate. The behavior of the gate makes it very difficult to distinguish it from clock rate, 
since both an increase in clock rate and an increase in attention yield an increase in pulses to the 
accumulator.  Changes in the switch can be differentiated from clock rate if more than one 
interval is being assessed and switch latency is identical for the different durations because the 
relative effect of switch latency will decrease with increasing target time.  The clock, attentional 
mechanisms, and the accumulator could be thought of as the perceptual (or encoding) stage of 
temporal information processing. A lot of research has focused on this level of interval timing, in 
part motivated by the search for the internal clock in the brain.    
After the clock stage of SET (which includes the clock, attentional mechanisms, and the 
accumulator) temporal information is shifted to the memory stage that includes both a short-term 
and long-term memory store (Gibbon, et al., 1984; Meck, 1996). The next three chapters focus 
on different aspects of memory for time that will be unpacked in the introductory sections that 
begin each chapter.  
The final stage outlined in the SET model is the comparison stage, in which accumulated 
temporal information is compared to representations in memory. When a specific threshold is 
met, a response is made, but the threshold may be some amount that is near the target time, and 
not specifically the exact target time. The threshold can be manipulated with payoff schemes, in 




perceptual stimuli (Wearden & Culpin, 1998). All measurable behavior is the cumulated 
outcome of these three stages.  
SET also proposes that learned intervals obey the scalar property, which is a domain 
specific form of Weber’s law (Gibbon, et al, 1984).  The variability of estimates increase 
proportionally such that the coefficient of variation, or the standard deviation divided by the 
mean, remains constant.  It is unclear where scalar variance arises in SET and it could be from 
the internal clock, from storage or retrieval processes, or from the decision stage (Gibbon, et al., 
1984; Meck, 1996; Wearden, 1999).  The internal clock has been assumed to emit pulses 
according to a Poisson distribution (Gibbon, 1992; Meck, 1996), however, this implies that 
relative variability would decrease with increasing target time, a behavior that would not 
demonstrate the scalar property (Gibbon, 1992; Staddon & Higa, 1999).  While it is plausible 
that the pacemaker rate varies from trial to trial due to a normally distributed random variable, or 
bias, which causes temporal estimates to remain scalar, it is also plausible that scalar variability 
arises from the memory stage of SET (Gibbon, et al. 1984; Gibbon, 1992; Wearden, 1999).  
Since the following chapters focus on memory for time, we can assess adherence to the scalar 
property in memory. 
 
 The three following chapters each represent separate research initiatives. The first, 
‘Working Memory for Time’ consists of two experiments that show the effects of brief delays 
inserted between learning and immediate recall of target times. This was designed with the 
intention of targeting active working memory processes. The second chapter, ‘Memory of 
Multiple Time Intervals’, consists of three experiments that show the effects of learning multiple 




and retrieval mechanisms when multiple target times are learned together. The final chapter, 
‘Implicit and Explicit Timing’ consists of three experiments designed to show the implicit 







Working Memory for Time 
There is mounting evidence that millisecond (ms) durations are processed differently than 
supra-second (ss) durations. Lewis & Miall (2003a, 2006) theorized that there are dichotomous 
timing mechanisms, automatic timing and cognitive timing. Automatic timing occurs when 
estimating brief intervals (ms) especially when repetitive or skilled movement is used to measure 
timing and when the task presents target times in a repeated, continuous, or predictable fashion. 
In contrast, cognitive timing occurs when measuring longer intervals (ss), in tasks that do not use 
temporally skilled motor movement, and in which the target time is presented using a 
discontinuous and unpredictable method. Additionally, there is evidence that when ms target 
times and ss target times are learned together the ms target times are overestimated while the ss 
target times are underestimated with respect to the target time (Jones, et al., 2004; Koch, et al., 
2007). This behavioral difference may be due to the automatic and cognitive timing mechanisms 
associated with ms and ss target times respectively. Estimates for the ms target times could be 
overestimated because the response time is added to the estimate. In contrast, the cognitive 
timing involved in the ss target time could cause estimates to be shorter because the cognitive 
processes detract from the accumulation of temporal information. Cognitive processes, especially 
those associated with working memory, are thought to be important for timing (Fortin & Breton, 
1995; Fortin et al., 1993; Gibbon, 1977; Wearden, 1999, Miall & Lewis, 2003a).  Working 
memory includes a variety of cognitive components, such as maintenance of information, 
inhibiting the influence of irrelevant information, and task switching. Working memory 




Jonides, 1991). Since frontal regions are also implicated in processing ss target times 
(Harrington, et al., 1998; Jones, et al., 2004; Lewis & Miall, 2003; Mangels, et al. 1998), we 
proposed that maintenance processes, specifically, are required during the accumulation of 
longer intervals and may contribute to the underestimation of long durations.  
Scalar expectancy theory (SET) can be used to explain this. As stated in the introduction, 
in SET, there are three stages of temporal information processing (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, 
Church, & Meck, 1984; Treisman, 1963). The clock stage consists of an internal clock 
(pacemaker/timer), a gate (switch), and an accumulator. The memory stage consists of a short-
term memory store and a long-term memory store. The decision or comparator stage consists of a 
‘comparator’ and represents the decision made when comparing temporal information in the 
accumulator and information in the relevant memory store. When a specific criterion is met, a 
behavioral response is made (Fig. 1). Supra-second target times are typically underestimated 
because as the length of the target duration increases, maintenance processes become 
increasingly necessary in order to keep temporal information active and available for use with 
limited decay. We propose that the underestimation of the ss target times is caused by decay of 
the temporal information during the accumulation process.  
Traditionally, the length of time that information can remain active in working memory 
has been tested using delays in recall tasks (Jonides et al, 2008). We decided to incorporate a 
delay into a temporal reproduction task. Since temporal information is dynamic and must 
accumulate over time we propose that longer target times are underestimated because the earlier 
temporal information decays while the ongoing temporal information accumulates. We propose 
that delays following ms target times would also lead to underestimation because the temporal 




discrimination timing tasks and have demonstrated a phenomenon called subjective shortening 
(Wearden & Ferrara, 1993, Wearden, et al, 2002).  Using temporal generalization, in which 
participants are required to specify if a comparator time is longer, shorter, or the same as a 
previously presented standard target time, Wearden & colleagues found that accuracy increased 
when the comparator was longer, decreased when the comparator was the same, and remained 
the same when the comparator was shorter as the length of the delay between the standard target 
time and comparison increased. This response pattern suggested that the memory representation 
of the standard target time decreased with increasing delay implying that temporal information 
decayed. Based on this and similar findings we expected that increasing delays would lead to 
shortened reproductions and that this would occur with the ss and ms target times.  
Our study, therefore, includes both ms and ss target times. In addition, we wanted to test 
our hypothesis that temporal information began decaying even while still accumulating. 
Therefore, we made the lengths of the delay, when summed with the ms target times, equal the 
length of the ss target times. We anticipated that the amount of underestimation of the ms target 
times coupled with a delay would be similar to the amount of underestimation of the matched ss 
target times.  
We incorporated multiple ms and ss target times into a roving referent paradigm in which 
the specific duration presented in a trial was pulled from a range of possible times (Allan, 1977). 
We wanted to minimize long-term encoding of the target time so that we could assess how the 
short-term memory representation was affected by the delay. Long-term encoding of a target 
time would likely minimize the effect of the delay because participants could rely on long-term 
representations as a basis for reproductions instead of having to maintain the information over 




previous studies to minimize long-term encoding of target times (Wearden & Ferrara, 1993, 
Wearden, et al., 2002; Koch et al., 2007; Jones, et al., 2004).  We matched delay lengths of the 
ms target times so that the sum of the target and delay times equaled the duration of the supra-
second target times in order to assess if underestimations of the ms and matched ss target times 
were similar.  
 
Experiment 1  
Methods 
Participants:  Thirty-one participants (29 female and 2 male) were recruited from 
Barnard College. Their ages ranged from 18 to 35 years with a mean age of 20. Participants were 
naïve to the purpose of the experiment and were compensated for their time with course credit.  
Materials:  Experimental events were presented using the psychophysical toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) compiled into a Matlab® (2007a, The MathWorks, Natick, MA) 
executable program presented on Microsoft XP® OS PC’s. Keyboard responses were recorded to 
the nearest millisecond.  
Procedure:  We used a roving referent paradigm to prevent long-term encoding of the 
target times. Millisecond targets, averaging 0.58s, consisted of five durations in logarithmic steps 
ranging from 0.40s to 0.80s (0.40s, 0.48s, 0.57s, 0.67s, and 0.80s).  Supra-second targets, 
averaging 2.91s, consisted of five durations in log steps ranging from 2.00s to 4.00s (2.00s, 
2.38s, 2.83s, 3.36s, 4.00s).  Delay one was designed as a control with a short fixed inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI) of  0.75 seconds. Pilot studies suggested that using a delay period shorter than this 
caused participants to feel that they did not have enough time to process the duration, especially 




qualitatively different than when the delay period was 0.75s or larger. The second and third 
delays roved with the target times. Delay two, averaging 2.33s, was composed of five intervals 
which ranged from 1.60s to 3.20s (1.60s, 1.90s, 2.26s, 2.69s, and 3.20s). When the five delay 
periods were summed with their corresponding millisecond target the sum corresponded to one 
of the supra-second intervals, i.e. 0.40s target summed with 1.60s delay equaled 2.00s; 0.48 
summed with 1.90 equaled 2.38, etc (Table 1). This allowed us to compare the estimation in ms 
target times with delay to matched ss target times. Delay three was twice the length of delay two 
(3.20s, 3.80s, 4.52s, 5.38s, 6.40s) and was included to obtain a fuller mapping of how delays 
altered temporal reproduction.  
 
Average        
0.58s  Roving Referents (ms)  0.40s  0.48s  0.57s  0.67s  0.80s  
2.33s  Delay 2  1.60s  1.90s  2.26s  2.69s  3.20s  
2.91s  Roving Referents (ss)  2.00s  2.38s  2.83s  3.36s  4.00s  
 
Table 1: Each target time category is represented by five intervals, or referents. The delay 
periods were chosen to ‘rove’ with the roving referents such that the sum of the delay period and 
the ms target time equal the ss target time. The second row shows the ms target referents used 
(Roving Referents (ms)), the third row shows the delay period (Delay 2), and the bottom row 
shows the ss target referents used (Roving Referents (ss)).   
 
Participants were run individually in isolated testing rooms. Instructions were read aloud 
by an administrator in which participants were informed that the goal of the task was to learn 
time intervals. They were instructed not to count during the trial and no feedback was given.  A 




on a black background. This was followed by a delay period during which the video screen was 
black.   The reproduction phase was initiated by the appearance of a red square 1.5 inches wide 
on a black background. A different shape was chosen for presentation and reproduction trials to 
prevent participants from becoming confused about which phase of the trial they were in. Any 
effects this may have on temporal estimates would be consistent across all trials for all 
participants. Participants were required to press the space bar to mark the end of the target 
duration and terminate the trial causing the red square to disappear. A variable inter-trial interval 
(ITI) ranging from 3s to 5 s with a mean of 4s separated trials. 
There were 10 trials for each delay period (delays one, two, and three) and average target 
duration (0.58s and 2.91s) for a total of 60 trials which took participants approximately 15 
minutes to complete. There were two presentations of each of the five roving referents for both 
average target durations. The trials were intermixed randomly by the computer for each 
participant such that no more than 2 trials of the same type (a single referent-delay combination) 
would be displayed consecutively.  
Data Analysis: The proportional error (PE) was calculated by subtracting the presented 
target time from the estimate and dividing this value by the presented target time ((estimate – 
target) / target) for each trial for each participant. Data points that fell beyond two standard 
deviations of the mean PE for each condition for each participant were removed with the 
assumption that estimates extending beyond this distribution represented non-task related 
distraction. This resulted in removing 3.4% of the data. The PE is a normalized measure of 
accuracy that allowed us to assess changes in estimates across delay periods and the roving target 
times. There were not enough trials for each roving referent target time to analyze them 




by the mean for each condition using the trimmed data set. The CV is a normalized measure of 
temporal variability. PEs and CVs were averaged for each condition for each participant and 




Figure 2: Proportional errors (PEs) for each delay length for Experiment 1. PEs greater than 
zero signify that estimates were larger than the target time, PEs less than zero signify that 
estimates were shorter than the target time, and PEs of zero signify that estimates were the exact 
target time. The millisecond target (ms) was overestimated with respect to the target time while 
the supra-second target (ss) was underestimated.  Error bars are standard error. 
 
 As seen in Figure 2, PEs for the supra-second targets were significantly shorter than PEs 
for the millisecond targets, F(1,30) = 100.093, p < .001. As predicted by previous studies the 




millisecond targets were estimated as larger than the target time (positive PEs). Unexpectedly, 
PEs increased with increasing delay, F(2,60) = 17.900, p < .001. The increase in estimates with 
increasing delay is opposite to our expectation. There was also a significant target time by delay 
period interaction, F(2,60) = 6.433, p < .01. We had expected that this interaction would be 
caused by a decrease in the PE for the ms time when coupled with delay periods as opposed to 
the typical overestimation found for ms target times when there is no delay. However, as Figure 
2 demonstrates PEs of the millisecond target increased more steeply with increasing delay than 
the PEs of the supra-second target. The delay did not cause estimates to shorten. With CVs as the 
dependent measure, there were no significant effects, Target: F(1,30) < 1; Delay: F(2,60) =1.569, 
p > 0.2. The scalar property was not violated across target times. Table 2 has mean CVs for the 3 
delay lengths and two target times. 
 
  Experiment 1    Experiment 2   
 ms Target  ss Target   ms Target  ss Target  
Delay 1  0.29 (0.11)  0.31 (0.08)   0.27 (0.06)  0.30 (0.11)  
Delay 2  0.32 (0.08)  0.32 (0.14)   0.29 (0.08)  0.29 (0.09)  
Delay 3  0.32 (0.11)  0.31 (0.09)   0.33 (0.13)  0.33 (0.09)  
 
Table 2: CVs (standard deviations) for the two target times across the three delays for 
Experiments 1 and 2. For Experiment 1: delay 1 is 0.75s, the delay 2 average is 2.33s, and the 
delay 3 average is 4.66s. For Experiment 2: delay 1 is the same (0.75s). Delays 2 and 3 differ 
depending on the target time. For the millisecond target the delay 2 average is 1.17s and the 
delay 3 average is 2.33s. For the supra-second target the delay 2 average is 5.83s and the delay 
3 average is 11.66s. There were no significant effects of CV in Experiment 1. There was a main 





We expected that reproductions would decrease with increasing delays. Based on the 
results of prior studies that demonstrated subjective shortening we had proposed that the 
inclusion of the delay would cause temporal information to decay and that the decay would 
increase (shortening target times) with increasing delay. However, we found that reproductions 
increased with increasing delays.  
We hypothesized that ss target times are typically underestimated because early temporal 
information decayed while the duration still accumulated. Using delays we created a situation in 
which ms target times needed to be maintained over a duration similar to the early information of 
the ss target time. The fact that estimates of the ms target time did not shift to underestimation 
with the delay could be for one of two reasons. If the underestimation found with ss timing was 
not due to memory processes, then we would not expect the delay to affect the ms target. For 
example, participants might be motivated to leave the experiment and provide estimates that are 
slightly shorter than the actual target time when the targets are longer (i.e. ss).  
The second reason could be that the maintenance memory process that occurs during 
accumulation is not the same as the maintenance process that occurs after temporal information 
is stored in memory. It is well documented that temporal information must be attended to in 
order to accumulate (Brown, 1997, 2008; Macar, et al., 1994). It is logical to assume that the 
attended to accumulated information must also be maintained as additional temporal information 
continues to accumulate. Temporal stimuli differ from most other types of stimuli studied in 
psychology because temporal stimuli are dynamic in the sense that they change over time 
(Spetch & Rusack, 1992). It is possible to know how long a duration is only after it has elapsed. 




from the process of maintaining information about the memory representation of an elapsed 
duration. 
The other unexpected result from our data was the fact that estimates increased with 
increasing delay instead of the predicted decrease.  The phenomenon of subjective shortening 
was interpreted as a decay of temporal information over time. Decay is just one possibility for 
the degradation of a memory representation. Interference from other information can also 
degrade memory representations (Jonides, et al, 2008). The delay period, being an interval of 
time, could be interfering with the memory representation of the target times. This distortion 
could be conceived of within SET. If the accumulation of temporal information continues during 
the delay period, the result would be a lengthening in the memory of the target time. We 
assumed that participants understand that the delay period is not a continuation of the target time 
nor is it a relevant target time for the task and this would explain why estimates are shorter than 
the sum of the delay and the target time. This implies that temporal information that accumulates 
during the delay does so at a reduced rate and this smaller accumulation is added to the memory 
representation. Instead of finding that temporal information decays from the memory store, it 
appears to leak into it during the delay period.  
To account for the target time by delay interaction we propose that the leakage from the 
accumulator to the memory store during the delay period occurs with a constant probability. If 
this were true the amount of interference from the delay would be a constant proportion of the 
delay length. As the delay increases, the interference would also increase. However, the increase 
in estimates will represent a larger percentage of the ms target time than of the ss target time.  
The relative size of the effect would be greater for a shorter target time, as we find in our data.  




the effect of the delay the same across target times.  If the leakage is a constant proportion of the 
delay length, and if the delay length were proportionally related to the target time, the effect size 
should be the same for all target durations. In Experiment 1 the delay periods were the same for 
both ms and supra-second target times. For Experiment 2 we made the proportional relationship 
between the delay period and the target time the same. Effectively, the second delay is twice the 




Participants: Thirty participants (26 female and 4 male) were recruited from Barnard 
College. Their ages ranged from 18 – 29 years with a mean age of 20. Participants were naïve to 
the purpose of the experiment and were compensated with course credit. 
Materials and Procedure:  The presentation software and hardware and the target 
durations were identical to Experiment 1. However, the lengths of the delay conditions differed. 
Delay 1 was identical for both targets (0.75 s) but delays 2 and 3 increased with the target 
duration. Delay 2 was twice the target duration. For the millisecond targets the delays were 
0.80s, 0.95s, 1.13s, 1.35s, 1.60s (1.17s average) and for the supra-second targets they were 4.0s, 
4.76s, 5.66s, 6.73s, 8.00s (5.83s average). Delay 3 was four times the target duration. For the for 
millisecond targets they were 1.60s, 1.89s, 2.26s, 2.69s, 3.20s (2.33s average) and for the supra-
second targets they were 8.00s, 9.51s, 11.31s, 13.45s, 16.00s (11.66s average). All other 
elements of the procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.    
Data Analysis: Data points that fell more than two standard deviations from the average 




during the task and were removed. This resulted in removing 3.2% of the data. The same 
measures (PEs and CVs) were calculated identically to Experiment 1 using the trimmed data set 
and submitted to separate 3 (delay length) x 2 (target time) repeated measures ANOVAs.  
 
 
Figure 3: Proportional errors for each delay length in Experiment 2. The millisecond target (ms) 
was overestimated and the supra-second (ss) was underestimated.   
 
Results 
PEs increased significantly with increasing delay, F(2,58) = 7.958, p < .01, but as can be 
seen in Figure 3, there was not a significant target by delay interaction, F(2,58) < 1. PEs for the 
supra-second targets were significantly lower than PEs for the millisecond targets, F(1,29) = 
44.344, p < .001. Participants underestimated the supra-second target time and overestimated the 
millisecond target time. There was a main effect of variability, F(2,58) = 5.830, p < .01. 




2 & 3: F(1,29) = 4.78, p < .05; delays 1 & 3: F(1,29) = 10.06, p < .01).. CVs did not differ across 
target times, F(1,29) < 1, manifesting the scalar property.  
 
Discussion 
We hypothesized that the increase in estimates with increasing delay period was due to 
interference of the delay period on the memory representation of the target time. Specifically, we 
speculated that a constant proportion of the delay length leaked into the memory store. In 
Experiment 1, the delay periods were the same length for the ms and ss target times leading to a 
larger effect in the ms targets than in the ss targets. By making the lengths of the delay periods 
proportional to the target time in Experiment 2, the effect of the delay was identical for the two 
target ranges.  
 
General Discussion 
Delays have often been used in non-timing studies to assess how memories change over 
time (Jonides, et al, 2008).  Alterations in memory over time can occur due to decay of the 
relevant information, but also due to interference by related, but irrelevant information. Our data 
demonstrates that delays, because they are a duration of time, interfere with existing memories of 
duration. Reproductions increased systematically with increasing delay period such that the 
effect size was directly related to the proportion of delay length to the target time.  
Estimates did not increase by the entire length of the delay period. Participants did not 
add the entire length of the delay period to the length of the target time. Instead estimates 
increased by a smaller amount that was directly related to the length of the delay period and 




attention continued with a constant probability during the delay period causing temporal 
information to accumulate. Interference occurred because the additional accumulation effectively 
leaked into the memory store and merged with the existing memory representation creating a 
longer memory and a longer estimate. This implies that temporal information from a non-
relevant duration (i.e. the delay period) can interfere with representations in the memory store.  
Our results corroborate previous studies demonstrating that ms target times tend to be 
overestimated with respect to the target and ss target times tend to be underestimated (Jones, et 
al., 2004; Koch et al., 2007). We had originally proposed that these differences derive from 
differences in how these target times are processed, specifically, that more cognitive processes 
are necessary for accurate ss timing. However, since the delay did not cause ms target times to be 
underestimated similarly to ss target times, we can assume that the maintenance that occurs 
during a delay is not a cause of the underestimation of ss target times. The fact that both target 
times were affected similarly by the delay suggests that working memory processes affect the 
two target ranges similarly. 
An alternative explanation for the overestimation of ms target times and the 
underestimation of ss target times in our study comes from Vierordt’s law (Lejeune &Wearden, 
2009). The original studies done by Vierordt and his students demonstrated that when a group of 
target times are learned, the shorter ones will be overestimated and the longer ones will be 
underestimated (Lejeune &Wearden, 2009). These studies tested durations from a few hundred 
ms to 60 minutes, suggesting that these behaviors were not dependent on range effects or 





Our results are the opposite of studies that demonstrated subjective shortening with 
delays. Subjective shortening implies that the memory representation of the standard decayed 
over time. Evidence for subjective shortening originally derived from work with pigeons (Spetch 
& Wilkie, 1983; Spetch  & Rusack, 1992). In the delayed match-to-sample task (non-human) 
subjects learned to associate a short target with one lit key and a long target with another lit key 
and in testing trials they had to choose the correct lit key associated with the presented target 
time.  The delay period between target and key light presentation was fixed during training, but 
changed during testing (Spetch & Wilkie, 1983). Subjects were prone to respond by pecking at 
the lit key associated with the short target time as the delay between interval presentation and 
key light presentation increased. An alternative interpretation of these results is that the subject 
was confused by the differences between training and testing (e.g. Zentall, 2006). This claim is 
supported by the fact that when the inter-trial interval (ITI) is altered instead of the delay period, 
subjects exhibit behavior that supports subjective shortening (Spetch & Rusak, 1992). Response 
accuracy increases when the ITI is shorter and decreases when the ITI is longer, even though the 
ITI occurs prior to presentation of the duration. Zentall (2006) argues that changes in the delay 
length make it difficult for the subject to differentiate when a new trial has begun. In fact, 
Dorrance, et al. (2000) completely obliterated the effects of subjective shortening when the ITI 
and delay were sufficiently distinct. 
However, we assumed that human participants were able to understand the task and, as 
discussed previously, studies using human participants were consistent with the phenomenon of 
subjective shortening (Wearden & Ferrara, 1993; Wearden, et al, 2002).  Using discrimination 
timing tasks Wearden & colleagues demonstrated that participants were more accurate at 




Ferrara, 1993; Wearden, et al, 2002). While the specific target times and delay periods used 
differed from ours, the ranges of the durations used do overlap.  
A major difference between the studies is the task type used.  Wearden and colleagues 
used a discrimination task, whereas we used a reproduction task. It has been argued that the tasks 
measure similar processes leaving no clear theoretical reason why the two tasks would yield 
directly conflicting results (Ivry & Hazeltine, 1995). However, the difference between these two 
tasks is similar to the difference in non-temporal memory tasks that investigate recall and 
recognition processes. Typically, recall tasks require participants to generate representations of 
the target from memory, such as the words from a word list. In contrast, recognition tasks present 
cues and the participant must decide if they are the same or different from a previous list. 
Reproduction tasks require the generation of the memory representation for recall, whereas 
discrimination tasks require a recognition to be made.  
Additionally, Bangert, et al. (2011) suggested that different timing tasks may be 
subserved by different mechanisms. Jones, et al. (2008) also demonstrated differences in 
processing different types of timing tasks. Furthermore, Lewis & Miall’s (2003) distinction 
between automatic and cognitive timing depends not only on the length of the target time being 
measured, but also on whether movement is used to measure the duration and whether the 
presentation occurred in a repeated and continuous fashion. Task type appears to be very 
important in understanding different cognitive and memory processes involved in timing.  
 In conclusion, we demonstrated that the time period between duration presentation and 
reproduction affects the memory representation of the target time. When this time period was 
increased it systematically distorted reproductions by adding a proportion of the delay period to 




perception has not previously been addressed. While this interference effect differed from 
previous work demonstrating that delay periods between duration presentation and reproduction 
would lead to decay of the memory representation, our results suggest that recognition and recall 







Memory for Multiple Time Intervals 
In the previous studies we used a delay embedded in each trial to target the working 
memory system. In the following set of experiments we shift focus to a typical, albeit 
inconsistent, finding in temporal memory, Vierordt’s law.  
Vierordt’s law was derived by Karl von Vierordt in 1868 (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009) 
and simply states that when multiple target times are learned together estimates of the shortest 
time will be overestimated and estimates of the longest target time will be underestimated. This 
is essentially what we found with estimates of ms and ss target times in the previous studies. 
Lejeune & Wearden (2009) in their comprehensive review of Vierordt’s law report that Vierordt 
verified this pattern across a range of target times from ms to minutes and used a variety of 
timing tasks including reproduction, discrimination, and verbal estimation. While comprehensive 
in these respects, a major drawback to the studies is that they were completed by Vierordt and his 
students, instead of a random sample of the population.  
Despite Vierordt’s studies spanning target times and timing methods, it remains unclear if 
Vierordt’s law is a robust effect. Some published studies have explicitly discussed the existence 
of Vierordt’s-like patterns using target times ranging from 4s to 80min (Grondin & Plourde, 
2007; Yarmey, 2000). Others have described the Vierordt-like effects with target times in the 
supra-second range in studies with patient populations such as Parkinson’s disease (Malapani, 
Deweer, Gibbon, 2002) or Schizophrenia (Van Volkinburg, et al., unpublished). However, there 
is also data in which Vierordt’s law does not occur. For example, Rakitin, Stern, & Malapani 




target time or underestimation of the 17s target time. It becomes difficult assessing when 
Vierordt’s law does and does not occur in the literature because it is not always noted, even when 
it does occur. For example, in their discussion of Vierordt’s law, Lejeune & Wearden (2009) 
report that some of their previously published data demonstrated Vierordt-like patterns with 
target times ranging from ms to supra-seconds, but the original publications did not discuss 
Vierordt’s law (Penton-Voak, et al., 1996; Wearden et al, 1998).  
One reason Vierordt’s law isn’t always discussed is that it contradicts evidence that 
estimates of a duration are veridical with real time (Wearden, 2003). Evidence demonstrating the 
veridical nature of estimates is in direct conflict with evidence of Vierordt’s law since estimates 
of the shortest target time are underestimated and estimates of the longest target time are 
overestimated (Jones & Wearden, 2003; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008; Wearden & Jones, 2007).  
Unpublished data collected in our lab demonstrated a Vierordt-like pattern when target 
times 1.1s, 2.2s, and 3.3s were initially learned (Gooch et al, submitted).  However, at recall one 
hour later, estimates for the larger two target times (2.2s & 3.3s) increased so much that the 
Vierordt-like effect was eliminated and the larger target times were overestimated, instead of 
underestimated.  
The current study had two purposes.  The first phase, training, consisted of the learning 
and reproduction of multiple time intervals which should be sufficient to observe Vierordt’s law.  
Since Vierordt’s law was not observed with target times of 6s & 17s (Rakitin, et al., 2005)  but 
was present in Gooch’s experiment when intervals were less than 3.3 s we decided to use target 
times that spanned the two studies. Therefore we used 3s, 6.5s, and 10s.   
Another unique element we incorporated into this study was intermixing the learning and 




and then a block of target time b, and so on. In later recall, participants are required to reproduce 
the target time presented in block 1, then the target time in block 2, etc. By associating distinct 
shapes with specific target times, we were able to elicit the memory representations of different 
durations by presenting the associated shape. Therefore, both learning and subsequent recall for 
different durations could be intermixed. 
The second purpose of the current study was to assess the reliability of the increase in 
estimates, especially of the longer two target times, with a delay between initial learning and a 
second reproduction.  Instead of an hour delay, participants were given a delay period of a few 
minutes. During the delay, participants performed a task designed to control behavior with the 
intention of reducing intersubject variability. Different states of arousal are known to affect 
timing performance (Fetterman & Killeen, 1995; Meck, 1996; Penton-Voak, et al., 1996; 
Treisman, et al., 1990; Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995) and we didn’t want participants 
distracted by potentially arousing events in their lives (e.g. upcoming exams) or by sleeping 
(during an hour break). Therefore we used a listening response task shown to not disrupt timing 
behaviors (Wearden, 1999, and in pilot data of our own). After the delay task we elicited 
estimates again by presenting shapes for participants to reproduce the associated durations. We 
expected either that the brief delay would replicate the increase in estimates found in Gooch’s 











Participants: Twenty-seven participants (26 females, 1 male) contributed to the final data 
for analysis. Their average age (and standard deviation) was 20.85 (4.68). Participants were 
naïve to the purpose of the experiment and were compensated for their time with course credit.   
Procedure and Materials:  Experimental events were presented using the psychophysical 
toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) compiled into a Matlab® (2007a, The MathWorks, Natick, 
MA) executable program presented on Microsoft XP® OS PC’s. Responses were recorded by 
key press on a standard keyboard. 
There were three separate blocks of trials. The first block was a timing reproduction task 
(training phase), the second block was a non-temporal listening task (distracter), and the third 
block was a timing reproduction test task (testing phase), which contained no stimulus 
presentation. The target times for the two timing phases were 3s, 6.5s, and 10s. Three different 
shapes corresponded to the three different target times. A blue circle, 1.5 inches in diameter, 
corresponded with 3s. A green square, 1.5 inches wide, corresponded with 6.5s. A red isosceles 
triangle, 1.5 inches high corresponded with 10s. Participants were run individually in isolated 
testing rooms. Instructions were read aloud by an administrator in which participants were 
informed that the goal of the task was to learn time intervals that corresponded with a specific 
shape. They were instructed not to count and no feedback was given. 
A training trial began with the presentation of one of the colored shapes on a black 
background for the corresponding target time.  After the target time elapsed, the shape was 
followed by a black screen for a variable inter-stimulus interval ranging from 0.3 to 0.7 seconds 




indefinitely until participants recorded their duration estimate by pressing the space bar to make 
the white shape disappear when they believed that the white shape had been present for the same 
duration as the preceding colored shape (Fig. A). The lack of color for the reproduction phase 
helped make it clear to the participant which phase of the trial they were in. A variable inter-trial 
interval (ITI) ranging from 0.5s to 1.5s with a mean of 1s separated trials. There were ten trials 
for each target time for a total of 30 trials which were intermixed pseudo-randomly by the 
computer for each participant such that no more than 2 trials of the same type could be displayed 
consecutively. Reproductions were recorded to the nearest millisecond. 
In the distracter task participants were instructed to press the space bar every time they 
heard the word “bat”. A vocal recording of the word “bat” was presented 40 times with a 
variable inter-trial interval ranging from 0.5s to 5s with a mean of 2.75s. The length of the task 
depended on the speed of participants reaction times. We anticipated that it would take subjects 
approximately 5 minutes assuming they completed the task quickly and accurately.  
 In the testing phase, participants reproduced the target times that they had learned during 
the training phase Participants were shown white shapes and required to press the spacebar to 
terminate the duration based on their knowledge of the target times presented during the training 
phase. A variable ITI of 0.5s to 1.5s with a mean of 0.75s separated the presentation of the white 
shapes. As before there were ten trials for each target time and trials were pseudo-randomized by 
the computer for each participant such that no more than 2 trials of the same type would be 
displayed consecutively.  
Data Analysis: Two measures of temporal perception were calculated. Proportional error 
(PE) was calculated as a measure of temporal accuracy by subtracting the target time from the 




accuracy with respect to real time it allows for the easy assessment of Vierordt’s law. Negative 
PEs show underestimation, positive PEs show overestimation, and PEs at zero show estimates 
veridical with real time. The coefficient of variation (CV) of estimates was used to assess the 
precision of temporal estimates. CVs were calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the 
mean of the estimates for each duration in each condition for every participant. Data points that 
fell beyond two standard deviations of the mean for each condition for each participant were 
removed with the assumption that estimates extending beyond this distribution did not represent 
temporal processes, but instead represented non-task related distraction. This resulted in 
removing 3.89% of the data. PEs and CVs were submitted to separate 2 (phase) x 3 (target 
duration) repeated measures ANOVAs. 
 
Results 
As would be expected from Figure 4, there was a target time by phase interaction for PEs 
(F(2,52)=8.01, p< .01). PEs decreased significantly with increasing target time at training 
(F(2,52)=4.15, p< .05). There was also a main effect of target time at testing (F(2,52)=5.224, p< 
.05). There was no significant difference between the PEs of the 6.5s and 10s targets, but the PE 
for the 3s target was significantly smaller than the PEs for the other two targets (3s, 6.5s: 
F(1,26)=8.215, p< .01; 3s, 10s: F(1,26)=5.975, p< .05; 6.5s, 10s: F(1,26)< 1). Additionally, the 
PEs for the 3s target did not differ across timing phases (F(1,26)<1). PEs for the testing phase 
were larger than PEs for the training phase (F(1,26)=6.904, p<.05). There were no other 
significant effects.  
For precision, as measured by the CV, there was a main effect of target time (main effect: 




6.5s: F(1,26)=19.73, p< .001; 3s, 10s: F(1,26)=6.12, p< .05; 6.5s, 10s: F(1,26)=1.44, p> .2). 
However, there was no effect of phase (F(1,26)<1; Table 3). Variability increased proportionally 
with increasing estimates at testing.  
On average, the distracter task lasted 6.82 minutes with a median time of 5.47 minutes 
(standard deviation of 4.74 minutes).  Some participants did not respond immediately after 
hearing the word “bat” so the distracter task ranged from 2.18 minutes to 18.60 minutes.  Since 
the length of the distracter task varied greatly, we wanted to see if changes in estimates were due 
to the increasing length of the distracter period. We correlated PEs for each target time and phase 
with the total length of the distracter task. We correlated CVs for each target time collapsed 
across phases since there were no significant differences of timing phase. PEs and CVs did not 
correlate with the length of the distracter task (Table 4).  
 
Experiment 1   Training    Testing   
3s 0.23 (0.10) 0.22 (0.18) 
6.5s 0.16 (0.06) 0.16 (0.07) 
10s 0.17 (0.07) 0.20 (0.22) 
Experiment 2   Training   Testing   
3s 0.24(0.10) 0.25(0.15) 
6.5s 0.19(0.09) 0.20(0.09) 
10s 0.18(0.07) 0.19(0.12) 
 
Table 3: The coefficient of variation (CVs) with standard deviations in parentheses for each of 







Figure 4: Proportional errors for each of the three the target times for training and testing in 




  PE    CV   
 r  Significance  r  Significance 
3s -0.11  0.57  -0.09  0.65 
6.5s -0.16  0.43  0.15  0.45 
10s -0.08  0.69  0.00  0.99 
Ave. 0.05  0.83  0.17  0.41 
 
Table 4: Pearson correlation coefficients for each target time at testing for PEs and CVs for 
correlations conducted with the length of the distracter task (Experiment 1). ‘Ave.’ is the average 








The primary goal of the training phase was to explore whether Vierordt’s law would be 
observed across a duration range that had previously produced ambiguous results (Gooch, et al., 
unpublished; Rakitin, et al, 2005). The PEs for all three target times were negative at training, 
meaning that all three were underestimated with respect to the target time. This is commonly 
found with target times in the supra-second range and is consistent with previous studies (Jones, 
et al., 2004; Koch, et al., 2007; Lewis & Miall, 2003a; see also chapter 2).  
However, this does not demonstrate the archetypical pattern of Vierordt’s law in which 
estimates of the shortest target time are overestimated. That said, if the shortest target time is 
overestimated and the longest target time is underestimated, we would expect a negative slope 
when plotted against increasing target times, which we see in Figure 4. Our data demonstrate a 
‘migration’ effect in which the memory representations of the three target times tend towards 
each other, even though it does not demonstrate a true form of Vierordt’s law. Interestingly, 
other work in which Vierordt’s law is discussed does not always show it in the true form either. 
For example, Yarmey’s (2000) study included target times ranging from 4s to 80min, all of 
which were found to be underestimated with respect to the target time. But because less 
underestimation was found for the shortest target time than the longest target time, it was 
presented as an example of Vierordt’s law. Similar claims were made by Lejeune & Wearden, 
(2009) with target times in the supra-second range.  
  Migration effects are also discussed in work with patient populations such as Parkinson’s 
(Malapani, Deweer, Gibbon, 2002) and Schizophrenia (Van Volkinburg, et al., unpublished). 
The migratory effect is discussed in comparison to controls, rather than in comparison to real 




longest time than controls. Shea-Brown, et al. (2006) argue that this effect is caused by an 
internal clock that starts slow and increases speed as the duration progresses causing shorter 
target times to be overestimated and longer target times to be underestimated. This effect is 
diminished when Parkinson’s patients are on medication suggesting that it is a disease related 
impairment (Malapani, et al., 2002; Shea-Brown, et al., 2006). The migration effect in our study 
and in other studies using healthy students as participants are likely caused by a different 
mechanism.  
 Both Goldstone, et al (1957) and Bobko, et al (1977) argue that the perception of stimuli, 
in general, is affected by the context in which it is presented. In our study, the context is defined 
by the presented target times. When finding the migration of estimates in their data, Bobko, et al, 
(1977) argued that the estimates tended toward a central tendency specified by the stimuli used. 
The 1977 study was a follow up to a previously published study and combined, the two 
demonstrated that the range of target times tested dictated the time order error in estimates 
(Schiffman & Bobko, 1974). The long target times used in Schiffman & Bobko (1974) were the 
short target times in Bobko, et al (1977). They were underestimated in the first study (being the 
long targets) and in the second study they were overestimated (being the short targets). The 
authors suggest that participants spontaneously grouped the stimuli into a category and the 
creation of the category caused estimates to drift towards the central representation of the 
category.  
This sentiment is echoed in recent work in the visual domain. Brady & Alvarez (2011) 
demonstrate that when participants are presented with an array of visual stimuli that can be 
categorized via a perceptual feature (e.g. color), participants estimate the size of an individual 




the size of the test item. Likewise, estimates tend to be smaller if the test stimulus is presented in 
a grouping in which the other stimuli tend to be smaller. Brady & Alvarez (2011) argue that the 
categorical grouping of perceptual items facilitates learning of the large volume of stimuli we are 
confronted with in our environment. Rather than remembering each detail of each item, we can 
remember a category of items and their relationships to each other. We propose that similar 
mechanisms are at work in our reproduction task, and that, participants spontaneously categorize 
the stimuli together. As in Bobko’s studies (1974, 1977), estimates of the short and long target 
times tend towards each other because it is the combination of stimuli presented that define the 
parameters of the category. 
Interestingly, this effect does not persist at later recall, even after only a few minutes. At 
testing, the PE for the 3s target time remained the same but the PEs for the 6.5s and 10s target 
times increased, essentially the opposite of Vierordt-like effects. This suggests that the migratory 
pattern of estimates is a relatively short-term effect. In our previous two studies we demonstrated 
that delays interfere with timing and cause estimates to increase. However, that occurred with 
delays immediately preceding each individual reproduction, whereas, the delay in this 
experiment followed a set of presentation and reproduction trials. Furthermore, there was large 
variability in the length of the distracter task (i.e. the delay period) across participants but the 
difference in the length did not correlate with increases in estimates. This suggests that the delay 
itself was not the cause of increased estimates.   
The PEs for the 6.5 and 10s durations did not differ (see Fig. 4) which means that they 
increased by the same proportion of the target time. In contrast, the 3s target remained the same 
across timing phases. This effect replicated the results of Gooch, et al, (in revision), using a 




the longest target time in their study (3.3s) suggesting that the result is not dependent on the 
absolute target time but on the relationship of the group of learned target times. Also, Gooch, et 
al., (in revision), showed that increases at testing were larger when a single target time was 
learned and recalled later than when multiple target times were learned and recalled later. 
Apparently, learning the target times together helps to attenuate the lengthening effect. This is 
likely because the target times were categorized as a group when learned. 
A final unique and unexpected result of this data was the fact that the CV did not change 
between phases, even though estimates for 2 of the 3 target times did. One of the fundamental 
aspects of temporal perception, typically referred to as the scalar property (of precision), is that 
as estimates increase, the variance increases proportionally such that the standard deviation 
divided by the mean is constant (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, et al., 1984; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008).  
Even though estimates increased at testing, variability increased proportionally such that the 
scalar property was not violated. This implies that variability in timing is not something encoded 
when durations are learned. Gibbon (1992) had proposed that scalar variability arises from 
memory mechanisms and it had been assumed that is was most likely from encoding processes 
(Gibbon, et al., 1984; Meck, 1996). However, our data demonstrates that scalar variability arises 
from retrieval processes. Previous studies using a similar paradigm (e.g. Gooch, et al, revision; 
Rakitin, et al, 2005) found decreases in variability between training and subsequent testing. 
However, they also included feedback during training and it has been documented that temporal 
variability decreases with feedback (Wearden & Lejeune, 2008).  
In contrast, Malapani, et al., (2002) demonstrated that patients with Parkinson’s disease, 
when completing training and testing phases of a timing task, did not violate the scalar property 




course, the implication is that when patients are on medication, their timing performance is 
overall improved, however, the scalar property held at testing when the patients were on 
medication regardless of medicated state during training. This result combined with ours 
provides strong evidence the scalar variability arises from retrieval processes. 
Typically, we anticipate that there will be a null result of the CV across target times 
demonstrating that the scalar property was not violated, however, our data showed a larger CV 
for the 3s target time than for the other two. Similar results have been found before and it has 
been argued that this is an effect of the reproduction task because the motor movement for the 
response adds non-scalar variability (Wearden, 2003; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). 
There is evidence in our data from both training and testing phases that when temporal 
stimuli are presented together they are spontaneously learned as a category. For the following 
experiment, we wanted to see if we could change the memory representations of the group of 
items simply by perturbing the memory representation of a single item. In order to do this we 
incorporated a retraining phase into the experiment. After participants learned the 3 target times 
and were given the delay, they would be presented with a retraining time using the shape 
associated with the middle cue.  One group of participants would be retrained with a shorter 
time, another group with a longer time, and the control group with the same time presented 
during training (6.5s). The changes in the memory representation of the all the target times, 
dependent on retraining a single target time,  would help us better understand how the categorical 







Experiment 2  
Methods 
Participants: Seventy-five undergraduate participants contributed to the final analysis. 
There were 31 in the control group (30 females, 1 male), 28 in the short retraining group (27 
females, 1 male), and 16 (16 females) in the long retraining group. The average ages (and 
standard deviations) were 18.72 (0.99) for the control group, 18.74 (0.94) for the short retraining 
group, and 18.53 (0.83) for the long retraining group.  
 Procedure: As in Experiment 1, experimental events were presented using the 
psychophysical toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) compiled into a Matlab® (2007a, The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA) executable program presented on Microsoft XP® OS PC’s. Responses 
were recorded by key press on a standard keyboard. 
There were four separate blocks of trials in this experiment. The first block was a timing 
reproduction task (training phase), the second block was a non-temporal listening task 
(distracter), the third block a timing reproduction retraining task (retraining), and the fourth 
block was a timing reproduction test task (testing phase). The events of training (block 1), of the 
distracter (block 2), and of testing (block 4) were identical to Experiment 1. The target times for 
the training and testing phases were also identical to Experiment 1 (3s, 6.5s, 10s).  
The events of retraining (block 3) were the same as training (block 1) except that a single 
target time was presented instead of three. Specifically, the task presented the shape that 
corresponded to the middle target time (the green square) for ten trials. In the control group, the 
single target time was identical to the middle target of the training task (6.5s). In the short 
retraining group, the single target time was 25% shorter than the middle target (4.875s) and in 




The just noticeable difference (JND) of timing values tends to be 15% (Staddon & Higa, 1999). 
The 25% shift was selected  with the intention that the change would be a small enough that 
participants would still consider it a new value of the original stimulus but large enough to 
produce a detectible shift in timing. Instructions to participants did not specify that this was a 
retraining phase and simply stated that they would need to reproduce a single target time during 
the block. 
Data Analysis: The same two measures (PEs and CVs) calculated in Experiment 1 were 
calculated for Experiment 2. Data points that fell beyond two standard deviations of the mean for 
each condition for each participant were removed with the assumption that estimates extending 
beyond this distribution did not represent temporal processes, but instead represented non-task 
related distraction. This resulted in removing 3.75% of the data. PEs and CVs were submitted to 
separate 2 (timing phase) x 2 (target) repeated measures ANOVAs with group (control, short 
retraining, or long retraining) as a between subjects factor. 
 
Results 
For PEs, there was no effect of retraining (F(2,72) < 1).  There was a significant 
interaction between phase and target (F(2,144) = 6.23, p <.01; see Fig. 5).  The main effect of 
target time at training was marginally significant (F(2,144) = 2.59, p = .079). There was also a 
main effect of target time at testing (F(2,144) = 4.42, p < .05). There was no significant 
difference between phases for the 3s target (F(1,72) = 1.37, p > .2), but PEs were significantly 
larger at testing for the 6.5s and 10s targets (6.5: F(1,72) = 20.08, p < .001; 10: F(1,72) = 15.92, 




There were also no effects of retraining on CVs (main effect: F(2,72) < 1).  As in 
Experiment 1, CVs did not differ across phases (F(1,72) = 2.21, p > .1).  However, there was a 
main effect of target time (F(2,144) = 18.56, p< .001). As before, CVs were larger for the 3s 
target than for the other two target times (3s & 6.5s: F(1, 72) = 18.90, p < .001; 3s & 10s: F(1,72) 
= 26.57, p < .001; 6.5 & 10s: F(1,72) < 1; Table 3). 
As shown in Table 5, participants learned the new target times in retraining fairly 
accurately. A univariate analysis of the estimates at the 3 levels of retraining demonstrated that 
the increase in estimates with increasing retraining condition was significant (F(2,72) = 58.28, p 
< .001).  Even though participants learned the new intervals, this knowledge did not affect the 
intervals learned previously. 
On average the distracter task lasted 7.96 minutes, with a median time of 5.63 minutes 
(standard deviation of 7.76 minutes).  The length of the task ranged from 2.20 to 48.80 minutes 
because some participants did not respond immediately to the word ‘bat’.  We correlated PEs at 
each level of target time and timing phase with the total length of the distracter task. We 
correlated CVs at each level of target time collapsed across timing phases since there was not a 
significant difference between phases. CVs did not correlate with the length of the distracter task 
(Table 6). PEs for the 3s target times at training did not correlate with the length of the distracter 
task, however, PEs for the 3s target at testing negatively correlated with the length of the 
distracter task (r(73) = -0.266, p < .05).  With increasing length of the distracter task, PEs for the 
3s target at testing decreased. PEs at the two other target times at testing did not correlate with 
the length of the distracter task.   
On a post-test questionnaire we asked participants to report if they believed the retraining 




target times. (Remember that the shapes were identical across phases which would help 
participants to relate the two). For the short retraining group (retrained on 4.875s), 24 of the 28 
participants (86%) answered this question. Of these, 12 (50%) answered that it was shorter, 9 
(37%) answered that it the same, and 3 (13%) replied that the retraining value was longer.  For 
the control group (retrained on 6.5s), 28 of the 31 (90%) participants answered the question. Of 
these, 9 (32%) answered that it was shorter, 11 (39%) answered that it was the same, and 8 
(29%) answered that the retraining value was longer. For the long retraining group (retrained on 
8.125s), 10 of the 16 (63%) participants answered the question. It is not clear why this group had 
a lower response rate. Of these, 1 (10%) answered that the retraining value was shorter, 7 (70%) 
answered that it was the same, and 2 (20%) answered that it was longer. Overall, participants 
were not completely aware of any changes in duration between the middle target time when 
presented during training versus during retraining.  
 
Group  Retraining   Estimates  
 Values   Retraining   Test   
    3s  6.5s  10s  
Short  4.875   4.80 (0.71) 2.97 (0.63) 6.92 (2.44) 10.51 (2.68) 
Same  6.5   6.57 (0.99) 2.94 (1.03) 7.55 (2.58) 11.92 (5.39) 
Long  8.125   7.82 (1.11) 3.12 (0.94) 7.99 (2.47) 11.23 (5.18) 
 
Table 5: Mean estimates (standard deviations) of the target time presented during retraining 
(Retraining) for the three groups in Experiment 2.  Mean estimates (standard deviations) are 
also presented for each target time from the testing phase (3s Test, 6.5s Test, 10s Test) for each 






Figure 5: Proportional errors for each of the three target times for the two timing phases in 
Experiment 2. Error bars are standard error. 
 
  PE    CV   
 r  Significance  r  Significance 
3s -0.27   0.02   0.10   0.4  
6.5s 0.01   0.94   0.13   0.27  
10s 0.00   0.98   0.13   0.25  
Ave. 0.04   0.76   0.14   0.24  
 
Table 6: Pearson correlation coefficients for each target time at testing for both PEs and CVs for 
correlations conducted with the length of the distracter task (Experiment 2). ‘Ave.’ is the average 
of the 3 target times correlated with the length of the distracter task. Only the 3s PE was found to 







The main goal of this study was to show how changing the memory representation of one 
of the three target times presented at training would change the representation of the other times. 
Instead, we found that retraining did not alter estimates at testing. The migratory effect replicated 
at training showed that participants created a spontaneous category of the presented target times. 
Table 5 shows that participants accurately learned the retrained duration, but this knowledge was 
not applied to later recall when all three target times had to be recalled. Even though the 
retraining was meant to alter the representation of one of the previously learned target times, by 
using the same presentation cue, it seems likely that participants kept the memory representations 
of the three target times separate from the representation of the retraining target time. This 
unanticipated result suggests that the multiple target times learned together were in fact separated 
from the retraining interval, even though the cue used to present the target times was identical.  
Apparently, when target times are categorized as a group, presentation context is very important, 
more so even, than the cue.  
When the retraining item was presented, we simply told participants that they would be 
shown more iterations of one of the intervals. We kept the retraining values within 25% of the 
middle target time length because we didn’t want the possible differences in the retraining 
duration to be too obvious. We wanted to prevent participants from recognizing the difference 
and changing their estimates. This goal was effective according to post-test self-reports. 
Participants were not completely aware of the change in the target time. The group retrained on 
the shorter retrain time was the only group in which at least 50% of the participants were correct 
in stating that the retrain was shorter. The other groups were worse at stating the difference 




the same, the retraining was presented within the same experimental context, and participants 
didn’t generally notice a difference in duration length, they still kept the categorically learned 
intervals at training separate from the retrained duration.  
This experiment replicated the previous effects on CV. Most importantly, there were no 
changes in CV between training and testing, even though estimates increased between training 
and testing, supporting the idea that the scalar property arises from retrieval.  As in the previous 
experiment, all estimates at training were underestimated with respect to the target time. This is 
typical in estimates of supra-second (ss) target times. In contrast, ms target times are often 
overestimated (Jones, et al., 2004; Koch, et al., 2007; Lewis & Miall, 2003a; see also chapter 1).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is likely that estimates of these duration ranges 
are mediated by different mechanisms. Lewis & Miall (2003a, 2006) theorized that automatic 
timing occurs when estimating short durations (e.g. ms), when measuring timing with tasks that 
require temporally based motor movement, and when the target times are presented predictably. 
In contrast, cognitive timing occurs when estimating longer durations (e.g. supra-seconds), when 
using tasks in which estimates are not dependent on motor movement, and when the target times 
are not presented predictably. Estimates are dependent on motor movement in the reproduction 
task, consistent with a situation that utilizes automatic timing, but with the variable ISI and ITI, 
target times are not presented predictably. Therefore, we assume that when short target times are 
presented in the reproduction task automatic timing resources are utilized whereas when longer 
target times are presented, cognitive timing is utilized. These different types of timing likely 
contribute to the behavioral differences found between ms target times and ss target times.  
When combined, the overestimation of ms target times and the underestimation of ss 




Vierordt’s? The data in the two previous experiments shows that ss target times can be 
underestimated and still migrate towards each other. The behavioral differences in ss and ms 
target times may be independent from the categorical learning found when multiple target times 
are presented together. We decided to re-run the first experiment using ms target times. We 
expected that all of the target times would be overestimated (being in the ms range) and that they 
would migrate towards each other. Specifically, the shortest would be more overestimated, while 
the longest would be less so. Additionally, we anticipated finding a similar pattern of results at 
testing. The shortest target time would not change, but the longer two target times would be even 




Participants: Twenty-eight undergraduates participated in this study for course credit. 
Their average age (and standard deviation) was 18.82 (0.98). Participants were naïve to the 
purpose of the experiment and were compensated for their time with course credit.   
Procedure and Materials:  The presentation of experimental events was identical to 
Experiment 1 except that the target times presented and reproduced were different. The three 
target times were 270, 590, and 900 ms. The blue circle, 1.5 inches in diameter, corresponded 
with the 270ms target. The green square, 1.5 inches wide, corresponded with the 590ms target, 
and the red isosceles triangle, 1.5 inches high corresponded with the 900ms target. As with 
previous experiments, participants were run individually in isolated testing rooms and were 
instructed not to count. They were informed that the goal of the task was to learn the time 




 Data Analysis: As in the previous studies, two measures of temporal perception were 
calculated. Proportional error (PE) was also calculated as a measure of temporal accuracy by 
subtracting the target duration from the estimate and dividing this difference by the target 
duration. CVs were calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean for each condition 
for each participant. Data points that fell beyond two standard deviations of the mean for each 
condition for each participant were removed with the assumption that estimates extending 
beyond this distribution did not represent temporal estimates, but instead represented non-task 
related distraction. This resulted in removing 3.92% of the data. PEs and CVs were submitted to 
separate 2 (timing phase) x 3 (target) repeated measures ANOVAs. 
 
Results 
PEs decreased with increasing target time (F(2,54) = 115.51, p < .001). As can be seen in 
Figure 6, the PE for the longest target time (900ms) was underestimated with respect to the target 
time (negative PE), while estimates for the other two target times were overestimated. There was 
also a main effect of test (F(1,27) = 39.61, p < .001). PEs were larger for the testing phase than 
for the training phase. The interaction was not significant (F(2,54) < 1).  
There was a target time by phase interaction for CVs (F(2,54) = 3.78, p< .05). In Figure 
7, CVs at testing appear to be similar to each other, whereas the CVs for training decrease with 
increasing target time. There was a main effect of target time for the training phase  (F(2,54) = 
9.74, p < .001). However, the CV for 270ms was significantly larger than the other two CVs 
(270ms & 590ms: F(1,27) = 9.29, p < .01; 270ms & 900ms: 14.39, p < .01), but the CVs for 
590ms and 900ms did not differ (F(1,27) = 1.23, p > .2). In contrast, at testing, there was no 




On average, the distracter task lasted 3.00 minutes (standard deviation of 1.17 minutes) 
with a median time of 2.66 minutes. The length of the distracter task ranged from 1.75 minutes to 
6.90 minutes.  To verify that changes in estimates were not a direct result of the varying length of 
the distracter period, we correlated PEs and CVs at each level of timing phase with the total 
length of the distracter task. None of these variables correlated with the length of the distracter 
task (Table 7).  
 
 
Figure 6:  Proportional errors for each of the three target times for the two timing phases in 






Figure 7: CVs for each of the three target times for the two timing phases in Experiment 3. Error 
bars are standard error.  
 
 
  PE    CV   
 r  Significance  r  Significance 
0.27s  -0.05   0.79   0.26   0.18  
0.59s  -0.26   0.18   0.21   0.29  
0.90s  -0.30   0.12   0.09   0.65  
Ave. -0.27   0.17   0.25   0.20  
 
Table 7: Pearson correlation coefficients for each target time at testing for both PEs and CVs for 
correlations conducted with the length of the distracter task (Experiment 3). ‘Ave.’ is the average 









We expected that estimates of the three ms target times would be overestimated at 
training. However, we were surprised to find that reproductions of the 0.9s target time were 
underestimated instead. We had expected that all of the ms target times would be overestimated. 
However, the distinction between ms timing and ss timing may not occur at exactly 1s. As we 
discussed before, automatic timing is used to make estimates of target times in the ms range and 
cognitive timing is used to make estimates of target times in the ss range. Automatic timing is 
used when estimating ms target times and using tasks that require motor movements and in 
which stimulus presentation is predictable. The implication is that the motor timing system is 
used to make timing estimates (Lewis & Miall, 2003b). Evidence suggests that the cerebellum is 
necessary for timing of ms target times (Koch, et al, 2007; Mangels, et al, 1998; Ivry & Keele, 
1989; Ivry, 1996). While 0.9s is technically less than a second, and therefore a “ms target time”, 
because of its proximity to 1s it may behave more like ss target times than ms target times.  It 
may be too long to utilize the motor timing system, and may instead rely on the cognitive 
system. The implication in cognitive timing is that attention and memory processes are needed to 
make estimates (Lewis & Miall, 2003b). Further evidence for this is seen in the activation and 
necessity of these regions to complete estimates of intervals in the ss range (Harrington, et al., 
1998; Koch, et al, 2003; Jones, et al. 2004; Mangels et al, 1998; Wiener, et al., 2010).  
 An alternative argument is that the overestimation of the .27s and .59s target times is an 
artifact of the reproduction task. Reproduction represents the estimate combined with the 
response time which would create a noticeably larger reproduction when the target time is 
sufficiently short. If the response time is constant across trials, it would represent a decreasing 




Therefore, shorter target times would be more overestimated because of response time, than 
longer target times. While this is logical, a drawback to this interpretation is that it does not 
account for why ss target times are then underestimated, whereas the reliance on separate 
systems (automatic and cognitive) would account for the behavioral differences.   
In the previous studies, the results demonstrated a loss of the migratory effect after a few 
minutes delay, but in this study that did not happen. Instead, all estimates increased so that the 
negative slope was maintained, but shifted vertically upwards (Figure 6). One explanation for 
this difference could be that the delay period was not sufficiently long. For this experiment the 
delay period lasted, on average, 3.00 minutes, whereas in the previous two experiments it lasted 
6.82 minutes and 7.96 minutes. This is likely because in the previous two experiments, many 
participants failed to respond after immediately hearing the word ‘bat’ causing the length of the 
distracter task to be longer. In this study, all participants responded quickly and accurately, 
shortening the length of the distracter task (i.e. the delay period). It is also possible that this 
occurred in this experiment and not the others because estimating ms target times served as a 
prime for making rapid responses to the stimulus in the distracter task. Although the distracter 
task we used had been shown in previous studies not to interfere with timing processes 
(Wearden, 1999; pilot data), these studies did not address how timing might influence the 
distracter task. Future work should compare reaction times in a simple reaction time task when 
the task is preceded by estimating ms target times or by estimating ss target times. 
 Finally, this experiment did not replicate the null difference between timing phases for 
CV. Instead, in training there was a decrease in the CV with increasing target time (Figure 7). 
Others have reported violations of the scalar property when using ms target times in reproduction 




involved in reproduction. However, what is unique to our results, is the fact that at testing these 
differences in variability disappeared, even with an increase in the estimates. Variability became 
scalar at testing. This provides additional evidence that the scalar property arises during retrieval.    
 
General Discussion 
These experiments provided evidence for the theory that Vierordt’s law is not specifically 
the overestimation of the shortest target time and the underestimation of the longest target time. 
When multiple target times are learned together the representations of these different durations 
migrate towards each other. Other researchers have already described the migration effect as 
Vierordt’s law (Lejeune & Wearden, 2007; Yarmey, 2000). The typical overestimation of the 
shortest target time and the underestimation of the longest target time seem to hold specifically 
when the shortest target time is a ms target time (up to about .9s) and longest is a ss target time. 
Target times in the ms range tend to be overestimated while target times larger than about .9s 
tend to be underestimated. It is important to keep in mind that the origination of the ‘true form’ 
of Vierordt’s law came from experiments completed by Vierordt on himself and one of his 
graduate students and have not been widely explored or replicated since (Lejeune & Wearden, 
2007).  
 The implication that when multiple target times are learned together, they migrate 
towards each other contradicts the veridical nature of timing. Estimates of target times closely 
represent the actual target times (Jones & Wearden, 2003; Wearden & Jones, 2007; Wearden & 
Lejeune, 2008). However, in these studies participants were presented with a single target time 
and were required to make shorter/longer/same judgments with comparison durations. Since 




target times are presented together, the representations migrate towards each other. In fact, if 
participants learn two standards, comparison judgments will be biased in the direction of the 
relationship between the two standards (Ogden, et al., 2008). If A is larger than B, and 
comparison judgments are being made with standard A, then longer comparison times are judged 
as shorter than A than when A is presented in isolation. In contrast, if A is smaller than B, the 
reverse is found.  Essentially, participants spontaneously categorize the durations presented 
together and this may not be dependent on task type. Furthermore, target times presented outside 
of the learned grouping do not affect the grouped category, as our data shows with the retraining 
in Experiment 2.  When trained in isolation the retraining interval was kept separate from the 
categorized group of target times.  
 There are, however, contradictions to the assumption that multiple target times learned 
together migrate towards each other. For example, in Rakitin, et al.’s (2005) study, student 
participants do not demonstrate a migration of the two target times (6s & 17s). We intentionally 
chose target times for Experiments 1 and 2 that overlapped with the Rakitin et al. (2005) study to 
assess if larger ss target times were impervious to the migration effect and found that the 
overlapping target times (6.5s & 10s) did migrate. A major difference between the two studies is 
that in Rakitin, et al.’s (2005) study, the two target times were presented in blocks, whereas in 
our study, they were presented intermixed.  It makes sense that the spontaneous categorization of 
target times would be less likely if the times are presented in separate blocks versus presented in 
conjunction. Additinally, estimates might be more prone to migration if more than 2 are 
presented together. 
 Our studies also demonstrated that the migration effect is fairly short lived when ss 




increased for the 2 longer target times, but not for the shortest target time. The migration effect 
appeared to be transient and not to survive a delay of even a few minutes. This could imply that 
the migration effect arises from encoding processes instead of long-term memory storage. Yet, 
when ms target times were used, the migration effect remained at later recall. This could be 
another indication of different neurocognitive processes underlying the two time ranges, both in 
learning and in retrieval after storage.  
Alternatively, it is possible that uneventful durations of time may expand in memory.  In 
our day to day lives, time is very much intertwined to the events that occur in time- what we 
need to do, when we need to get it done, how long it will take. Learning a time interval that is 
relatively devoid of events may create a situation in which the cognitive architecture we typically 
use to estimate time is no longer useful. Without an event structure, the memory representations 
of time may dilate. By categorizing the representation of different durations, participants may be 
able to diminish this dilation. This is consistent with the results of Gooch, et al., (in revision). 
They showed that when participants learned a single target time, estimates were much longer at a 
later testing, than when the same target times was learned and tested with other target times.  
 Our results also demonstrate a unique finding regarding the scalar property of variance. 
Gibbon (1992) suggested that scalar variance arose from memory processes, but it has long been 
assumed it came specifically from the encoding phase (Meck, 1996). Our data show that the 
scalar property can also arise at retrieval. In the first two experiments, there is no difference in 
the CV for the two timing phases. If scalar variability only arose at encoding, then when 
estimates for the 6.5s and 10s target times increased at later testing, we would expect the CV to 




Furthermore, the violation of the scalar property of variance at training in Experiment 3 
disappeared at testing.  This, again, suggests that scalar variance arises during retrieval. 
 In conclusion, our experiments support the theory that ms and ss target times are 
processed via different systems and that these differences persist over a delay. We also make the 
first differentiation between overestimation and underestimation of time intervals and a 
migration effect across multiple target times and provide a testable theory for when Vierordt-like 
effects appear in timing data. Intervals learned together will exhibit migration effects in the short 






Implicit and Explicit Timing 
The results of the previous experiments demonstrate that our memory representations of 
time increase when there are delays, both in the short-term and over longer periods. If this were 
an accurate reflection of our use of temporal information then we would rarely be late and we 
would schedule ourselves plenty of time to complete that paper or prepare that lecture because 
when we think back to how long it took us to do these tasks previously our memory of the 
duration would be longer. The dominant approach to assessing timing in the lab may not 
represent how we use timing outside of the lab because participants focus solely on the temporal 
domain during the experiments. Very rarely do we focus solely on timing in our daily lives, but 
we continuously learn and use temporal information.   
The studies discussed so far have relied on explicit memory. While the discussion of 
implicit and explicit memory has proven to be an important discourse in memory research over 
the last decade, the distinction has not been discussed for memory for time. This is in part 
because the majority of research on interval timing has focused on locating and verifying the 
internal clock, not the underlying memory mechanisms involved in learning and remembering 
intervals of time. Explicit memory is studied when participants are aware of the relevant stimuli 
and can verbally describe the stimuli. Implicit memory is studied when participants are not aware 
of the relevant stimuli, but still exhibit learning, or cannot verbalize the relationship of stimuli, 
but can still respond to the patterns (Smith & Grossman, 2007; Smith, 2008). In their seminal 
paper demonstrating separate memory systems, Knowlton & Squire (1993) presented amnesiac 




categorize new displays correctly, but the patient group was not able to recognize which items 
were presented during training. Following this paper, a substantial amount of neuroimaging 
work, patient, and behavioral studies have supported the distinction of multiple memory systems 
(e.g. for reviews: Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Poldrack & Foerde, 2008; Smith & Grossman, 2007).  
We wanted to use temporal stimuli to change behavior without making time explicit. To 
help clarify what this would mean, it is important to understand another type of distinction 
commonly made in the domain of temporal information processing- prospective and 
retrospective timing. The previous tasks have all been prospective. Participants were aware that 
the goal of the task was to estimate presented intervals of time. In retrospective tasks participants 
are not aware that the goal of the task is to estimate a duration of time. Retrospective tasks 
present participants with another task and afterwards participants are asked to estimate how long 
they spent doing the task. The temporal information isn’t learned implicitly in these types of 
tasks. Instead evidence suggests that participants use their memory of events to estimate how 
long the duration lasted (Block, 1992). If more events occurred during the interval to be timed, 
estimates increase (Block, 1992; Hicks, et al., 1976; Zakay & Block, 2004). While prospective 
tasks are clearly explicit, retrospective tasks are not always implicit. Retrospective tasks begin 
similarly to standard implicit memory tasks in that the goal of the task is not known, but 
retrospective timing tasks become explicit because once participants are asked to exhibit a 
behavior (estimate a duration) they are told explicitly what is expected of them and use their 
memory of the events to explicitly construct an estimate of the duration.  
Timing studies using non-human subjects should also be considered explicit. While the 
instruction is not verbally explicit, subjects are taught that they must attend to time through 




accuracy criterion. Animal subjects learn that they must know when to respond, so while the 
instructions are not verbally explicit, they are behaviorally so.  Many timing tasks for humans are 
derived from tasks used with animals (e.g. temporal generalization, bisection, peak interval), but 
use verbal instructions. Even with these instructional differences, results from human and non-
human timing tasks are similar (Allan 1998; Allan & Gibbon, 1991; Rakitin, et al, 1998; 
Wearden, 2003b) supporting the idea that the training non-human subjects undergo prior to 
testing make the goals of the task explicit.  
In order to study implicit memory for time we constructed a task in which participants 
were required to categorize Mr. Potato Head™ into one of two categories of hat preference. The 
usage of this stimulus was modeled after Shohamy, et al., (2004) in which participants were 
required to make ice cream preference choices for Mr. Potato Head™. The various 
interchangeable features of Mr. Potato Head™ (e.g. glasses, mustache, bowtie) were used as 
probabilistic predictors of category membership. Each feature predicted category membership 
(i.e. ice cream choice) with a specific probability, such that neither a single feature, nor a rule 
based on the combination of features, could be relied on to indicate category membership. We 
wanted to be able to compare performance on the implicit timing task with performance on an 
explicit version of the task, so instead of using a probabilistic structure, we created a rule-based 
structure based on Allen & Brooks’ (1991) study which used three relevant features, but only 2 
out of the 3 needed to be present to predict category membership. One of the three relevant 
features was presentation duration, while the other two were visual features. Short presentation 
duration predicted one hat, while a longer presentation duration predicted the other hat. The 
original Allen & Brooks (1991) study did not target implicit learning, but focused on different 




based task is too complex to be verbalizable, implicit learning can occur (Smith, 2008). We 
anticipated that the unexpected nature of the temporal feature in combination with the visual 
features would reduce participants’ ability to construct a rule related to it, allowing implicit 
learning, which would be demonstrated by their effective categorization of the stimulus.   
Following a training phase with feedback, participants were given a testing phase that 
contained no feedback. The testing session presented images of Mr. Potatohead™ without a hat 
at both the short and long presentation durations.  We also incorporated a temporal bisection task 
(a type of a timing discrimination task) into the testing phase. In temporal bisection tasks, 
participants are trained on two target times, a short and a long one. Then participants are 
presented with the two target times as well as intermediary durations. For the intermediary 
durations participants must decide if they are more like the short target time or more like the long 
target time. Typically, as the presentation duration increases the probability of responding long 
also increases allowing us to assess temporal accuracy and precision. In this task participants did 
not know that they needed to decide if the intermediary durations were more like the short or the 
long presentation duration. We simply presented them with the different durations and asked 
them to predict Mr. Potatohead’s™ hat choice. This way, we could temporal accuracy and 
precision during the testing phase.  
New and repeat items were also included during testing. In order to verify that a category 
is learned, it should extend to novel exemplars (Smith, 2008; Smith & Grossman, 2007). We 
assumed that participants who knew the rule would categorize novel and repeat items similarly, 
relying on the use of the rule. Whereas participants who did not know the rule may rely on 
memory representations of the specific items to correctly categorize exemplars and not 




relationship. If participants responded similarly to repeat and novel items we would infer that 
they had implicitly learned the relationship between the 3 features and hat choice. However, if 
participants responded more quickly or more accurately to repeat items than novel items, then we 
would infer that participants relied on item specific memory representations.  
 
Experiment 1  
Methods 
Participants: Twenty-nine participants participated for course credit. Their average age 
(and standard deviation) was 18.79 (1.10). Participants were naïve to the purpose of the 
experiment. Fourteen female participants were randomly assigned to the explicit group and 15 
participants were randomly assigned to the implicit group, 1 of whom was male. 
Materials: Stimuli were created using photographs of a Mr. Potato Head™ doll. Four 
visual features varied across the images. Two of the four features, bow tie (absent, present) and 
mustache (absent, present), were irrelevant features included to increase the number of 
exemplars and to create noise to decrease the likelihood of learning the rule. The other two visual 
features, glasses (absent, present), and shoes (blue, white) were the relevant features that 
participants needed to learn. The length of time that the image was on the screen (short, long) 
was the third relevant feature.  
Category membership was defined by the presence of two of the three relevant features. 
Participants were required to use the features to predict if Mr. Potato Head™ would be wearing a 
police hat or a baseball cap in the following image. The three features that predicted the police 
hat were the presences of glasses, blue shoes, and a presentation time of 3.33s. The baseball cap 




category membership required two out of the three possible binary features, we could assess 
differences in learning when the two features were visual cues versus when the two features were 
temporal and visual cues. Each irrelevant feature occurred equally across both categories. A 
single relevant feature predicted the correct response 75% of the time.  
In total there were 32 distinct exemplars based on the relevant visual and temporal 
features. Of these, 16 were presented during training and all 32 were presented during testing so 
that we could assess item specific memory. The images presented during training and testing 
were randomized across subjects.    
Procedure: Images were presented using an executable program developed in Matlab 
using the psychophysical toolbox on PCs with the XP operating system (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 
1997). The training phase consisted of 80 trials, i.e. five presentations of the 16 exemplars. The 
training phase was designed in 5 blocks such that each block contained one presentation of each 
exemplar. The blocks ran continuously for the subject, but allowed us to assess if learning 
improved over time. A trial began with an image of Mr. Potato Head™ presented for one of the 
target times (1.67s or 3.33s) and was followed by a black screen with white text which stated: 
“Will Mr. Potatohead put on his police hat or his baseball cap? Press the blue key for the police 
hat and the yellow key for the baseball cap.” Responses were recorded on a standard keyboard to 
the nearest millisecond. The ‘f’ key was covered with a yellow sticker and the ‘j’ key was 
covered with a blue sticker.  After participants made their choice they were shown an image of 
Mr. Potato Head™, identical to the previous one, except that now he was wearing the 
appropriate hat. Participants were told if they were correct or incorrect by the placement of the 
words ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ at the bottom of the photo (Fig. 8). The feedback remained on the 




so that participants could observe the relevant features during feedback. There was a fixed ITI of 




Figure 8: Two examples of trials presented during training. First participants saw Mr. Potato 
Head™ without a hat and then were prompted to predict which hat he would choose to put on. 
The trial to the left, sequenced from bottom to top, demonstrates the series of events for a 
participant who correctly predicted that Mr. Potato Head™ would put on his baseball cap. 
‘Correct’ is written at the bottom of the image. The trial to the right demonstrates the series of 
events for a participant who incorrectly predicted that Mr. Potato Head™ would put on his 
baseball cap. ‘Incorrect’ is written on the bottom of the image. Feedback lasted for the time used 
during presentation. Testing trials differed only in that there was no presentation of Mr. Potato 





After the training session, subjects were shown white text on a black screen that told 
them that the testing session differed from the training session because there would no longer be 
feedback. This information remained on the screen indefinitely and participants were told to 
press any key when ready to continue. A temporal bisection task was incorporated into the 
discrimination task during testing. In a temporal bisection task intermediary comparison 
durations are included requiring participants to decide if the duration is closer to the longest 
target time or closer to the shortest target time.  During testing, images of Mr. Potato Head™ 
were presented for the target times from training (1.67s, 3.33s) as well as for 5 comparison times 
(1.95s, 2.33s, 2.50s, 2.78s, 3.05s). These 7 target times were each presented for 16 trials 
randomly assigned to the 32 exemplars. Participants were not told that the presentation duration 
would vary during testing. The ITI was the same as in training (4s) and their response prompted 
the next trial. 
At the beginning of the experiment participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
groups. The explicit group was told the categorization rules and given the following story that 
explained the rules and made clear how time was relevant. The implicit group was not given the 
categorization rules but the text in italics was presented to both groups:  
 
You will be shown a series of images of different mornings in Mr. Potato Head’s 
life. You are asked to decide if Mr. Potato Head™ is going to work that day or if 
he is going out to run personal errands. If he is going to work, he will put on his 
police hat, but if he is going out on personal errands, he will put on his baseball 
hat. You will see an image of Mr. Potato Head™ without a hat and then you will 
decide which hat he will put on.  
 
To help you make your decision, there are some things you should know. When 
Mr. Potato Head™ gets up in the morning you can often tell where he will be 
headed that day by how long he stands in front of his closet. Typically, when he 




for more time. However, there are some mornings that he feels rushed, so the time 
he spends in front of his closet is not the only cue that will tell you he will be 
going that day. Mr. Potato Head™ is farsighted and on days when he has to go to 
work he will wear his glasses because he has a lot of paperwork to read. However, 
there are some days in which his personal errands also require him to wear his 
glasses and some days when he does not wear his glasses when he leaves for 
work. Finally, it is required by the Potato Head™ Police Department that all 
employees wear blue shoes. If Mr. Potato Head™ is wearing blue shoes, he is 
likely going to work that day. However, there are days when he forgets and wears 
his white shoes to work and his blue shoes to run errands. In order to know if Mr. 
Potato Head™ is going to work, there will need to be at least 2 of the 3 features 
that will signal his going to work.  
 
 After participants completed the training and testing phases of the experiment they were 
given a brief questionnaire. The implicit group was asked if they noticed the different 
presentation durations and if so, if they used them to make their choice. Both groups were asked 
to provide verbal estimates of the presentation time of Mr. Potato Head™ in his police hat and in 
his baseball cap.  
Data Analysis:  Percent correct and reaction times (RTs) were calculated for each 
condition for each participant for each block in training. Percent correct and RTs were submitted 
to separate 2 (cue: temporal, visual) by 5 (blocks) by 2 (group: explicit, implicit) repeated 
measures ANOVAs with group as a between subjects factor.  Half of the participants (8/15) in 
the implicit group reported in the post-test questionnaire that they noticed the different 
presentation durations of Mr. Potato Head™. None of them reported using this information to 
make their choice. To assess if this awareness affected responses during training, we submitted 
accuracy measures to a 2 (cue) by 5 (block) by 2 (group: aware, unaware) repeated measures 
ANOVA with group as a between subjects factor. 
 Multiple analyses were completed to assess accuracy and response rate during testing. 




membership was predicted by temporal and visual cues and the target time was one of the two 
standards (1.67s, 3.33s) presented during training.  We did not calculate percent correct when the 
target time was one of the comparator durations, because none of them were actually correct. We 
also calculated percent correct and RTs for trials in which category membership was predicted 
by visual features across all levels of target time (since target time was an irrelevant feature in 
these cases). Percent correct & RTs were submitted to separate 2 (cue: visual, temporal) by 2 
(new, repeat) by 2 group (explicit, implicit) repeated measures ANOVAs with group as the 
between subjects factor. This allowed us to see how accurate participants were at a later testing 
and if there were differences in novel and repeat stimuli.  
We also calculated participants’ probability of responding long (in this case, police hat) 
for each target time in which category membership was predicted by the temporal and visual 
feature.   The probability of responding long (P(L)) was submitted to a 2 (new, repeat) by 7 
(target time) by 2 (group) repeated measures ANOVA. Means of the verbal estimates from the 
post-test questionnaire were calculated and submitted to a 2 (hat) x 2 (group) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Accuracy from testing, P(L), and verbal estimates were submitted to separate 




The term ‘visual cues’ will refer to conditions in which both relevant features were visual 
cues and the term ‘temporal cues’ will refer to conditions in which one relevant cue was 






Figure 9: Percent correct for each cue/group relationship across blocks presented during 
training in Experiment 1. Error bars are standard error. 
 
Training: There was a cue by block by group interaction for accuracy (F(4,108) = 2.49, p < .05; 
see Figure 9). For the implicit group, accuracy was higher when presented with visual cues than 
when presented with a temporal cues (F(1,14) = 25.80, p < .001). Also, for the implicit group 
overall accuracy increased as the task progressed (F(4,56) = 12.10, p < .001). In contrast, for the 
explicit group there was a cue by block interaction (F(4,52) = 5.07, p < .01). Accuracy for the 
visual cues for the explicit group didn’t change across blocks, (F(4,52) < 1), but accuracy for the 
temporal cues increased across blocks (F(4,52) = 9.26, p < .001). Performance was better when 
presented with visual cues than with temporal cues for the explicit group (F(1,13) = 18.75, p < 
.01). Additionally, the overall ANOVA showed a cue by group interaction (F(1,27) = 4.58, p < 
.05), a main effect of cue (F(1,27) = 41.67, p < .001), a main effect of group (F(1,27) = 82.99, p 




visual cues, and the explicit group was more accurate than the implicit group. Overall accuracy 
improved over blocks of trials.  
RTs decreased over the blocks of trials (F(4,108) = 53.22, p < .001). RTs were longer for 
the temporal cues than for the visual cues (F(1,27) = 21.21, p < .001). Groups did not differ in 
their RTs (F(1,27) < 1) and there were no other significant effects. The only significant effect of 
self-reported awareness of time in the implicit group was a cue by block by group interaction 
(F(4,52) = 4.34, p < .01).  Looking at the temporal cues only, there was not a significant effect of 
group (F(1,13) < 1), which would be expected if participants were effectively using their 
awareness to categorize the images.  
 
 
Figure 10: Percent correct for explicit and implicit groups for stimuli that contained visually 
predictive cues (Visual) or combined visual and temporal cues (Temporal) for the testing phase 
of Experiment 1. There was a significant difference between groups for the  temporal cues, but 





Testing: As seen in Figure 10, there was a significant cue by group interaction for accuracy 
(F(1,27) = 41.77, p < .001). The two groups did not differ in accuracy for the visual cues 
(F(1,27) = 3.49, p = 0.07), but they did differ when for the temporal cues (F(1,27) = 134.15, p < 
.001). The explicit group was more accurate with the temporal cues than the implicit group. The 
overall ANOVA showed a main effect of cue, with accuracy higher for the visual cues than the 
temporal cues (F(1,27) = 95.04, p < .001). Accuracy was also higher for the explicit group than 
for the implicit group (F(1,27) = 95.13, p < .001). There were no significant effects of novel 
items (main effect: F(1,27) < 1; interaction with group (F(1,27) = 1.53, p > .22); interaction with 
cue: F(1,27) < 1), suggesting that neither group used item specific memory to categorize the 
stimuli.  
The only significant effect of RTs was a cue by novel by group interaction (F(1,27) = 
5.45, p < .05). For the implicit group RTs for the temporal cues were significantly longer than for 
the visual cues (F(1,14) = 7.10, p < .05), however, this was not significant for the explicit group 
(F(1,13) < 1).   
There was a significant interaction between target time and group for the P(L) (F(6,162) 
= 46.69, p < .001). As can be seen in Figure 11, the P(L) significantly increased as the 
presentation duration increased for the explicit group (F(6,78) = 65.25, p < .001), but not for the 
implicit group (F(6,84) < 1). There were no significant effects of novel items (main effect: 
F(1,27) = 1.15, p > .2) nor any other significant effects.  
A significant hat by group interaction (F(1,23)  = 5.41, p < .05) was found with verbal 
estimates collected in the post-test questionnaire (Table 8). Four participants did not fill out this 




analysis. The verbal estimates of the explicit group were significantly larger for the police hat 
than for the baseball hat, as we would expect (F(1,11) = 342.29, p < .001). However, verbal 
estimates for the implicit group did not differ across hats (F(1,12) < 1). There were no significant 
differences between aware and unaware participants in the implicit group for accuracy during 
testing (F(1,13) <1), for P(L) (F(1,13) = 1.36, p > 0.26), or for verbal estimates (F(1,11) < 1).  
 
Figure 11:  Probability of responding police hat (long, 3.33s) for the explicit and implicit groups 
for the target times (1.67s & 3.33s) and the comparison times in Experiment 1. Error bars are 
standard error. 
Group  Police Hat  Baseball Cap 
Explicit  4.42 (0.63)  2.62 (0.65) 
Implicit  4.77 (4.73)  4.31 (3.65) 
 
Table 8:  Means (standard deviations) of the verbal estimates of the presentation duration of Mr. 
Potato Head™ in his respective hat (police hat or baseball cap) provided in a post-test 





 The explicit group performed as expected.  During training their performance on the 
visual cues was near ceiling, and there was an increase in performance on the temporal cues as 
training increased. This is most likely due to the instructions they were given. The instructions 
clearly specified the visually predictive cues, but the temporally predictive cues were relative 
(short time vs. long time). Participants would need to develop familiarity with the relation before 
performing at ceiling. This is especially noticeable in the steep increase from blocks 1 to 2 for 
the explicit group’s accuracy of the temporally cued stimuli seen in Figure 9. Nonetheless, 
accuracy for temporal cues did not reach the same level as visual cues (although they did not 
significantly differ) for the explicit group suggesting that categorization tasks using these cues 
are more difficult.  One reason that people may have been better at categorizing the visual cues 
than the temporal cues is that time perception can be variable across trials because it is affected 
by attention levels. When more attention is directed towards time, estimates will increase, and 
with less attention, estimates decrease (e.g. Macar, et al., 1994). Time is unlike other stimuli 
because the entire duration must elapse before it can be identified and stored in memory. In 
contrast, once visual cues are perceived, participants know whether or not Mr. Potatohead™ is 
wearing glasses, for example, and do not need to continue to focus their attention towards that. 
Attention needs to be directed towards time during the accumulation process. However, it is 
probably difficult to sustain that level of attention trial after trial, and therefore, it is likely that 
attention towards time fluctuated from trial to trial such that on some trials, the shorter target 
time could have seemed longer and the longer target time could have seemed shorter.  
 The implicit group was able to learn to categorize using the visual cues, but not the 




accuracy levels for both cues for the explicit group (Fig. 9) suggesting that the implicit group 
was able to learn the to categorize the visual cues. This was corroborated by the fact that 
accuracy for the visual cues at testing was the same for the two groups suggesting that the 
parameters of the task were sufficient for learning to occur in the visual domain. The poor 
performance in the temporal domain is likely due to the fact that the visual domain is a dominant 
perceptual system in humans and the importance of the visual domain was further emphasized by 
the use of a toy that is a conglomeration of visual cues.  Likely, subjects had some prior 
understanding or experience with Mr. Potato Head™ that emphasized the importance of the 
visual configurations and, perhaps, increased the irrelevance of time.  However, these facts were 
intentionally utilized as a means of distracting participants from the relevance of time and 
preventing them from recognizing, and therefore verbalizing, the rules used to correctly choose 
Mr. Potato Head’s hat.  
While the implicit group did not learn the temporal cues, they also did not rely on a single 
visual cue to predict hat choice. If they had relied consistently on a single visual cue, accuracy 
would have been at 75%, since each individual cue predicted hat membership 75% of the time. 
Instead, participants in the implicit group had an accuracy level of 47% for the temporally cued 
stimuli. Additionally slower RTs during testing for the implicit group for the temporal cues 
suggested that participants were using more cognitive resources to surmise the correct answer, 
rather than responding based on a single specific visual cue. Some participants in the implicit 
group self-reported an awareness of different presentation durations, but analysis comparing the 





Interestingly, the verbal estimates given by the implicit group for both hats that were 
larger than the actual presentation time for either hat (Table 8). The verbal estimates were most 
similar to the fixed ITI of 4s. We kept the ITI at a fixed duration since our previous experiments 
(e.g. Working Memory for Time) demonstrated that altering non-target intervals can affect 
estimates of the target time and we wanted to minimize changes in estimates due to changes in 
trial based intervals. However, since the fixed ITI was presented after every trial, it was the most 
frequently presented duration, and the implicit group may have been influenced by this 
information when making their verbal estimates. Additionally, the verbal estimates of the explicit 
group were higher than the actual presentation times (Table 8), so it is possible that verbal 
estimation yields overestimation, whereas reproduction yields underestimation of time intervals 
in a similar range.  
Finally, both groups relied on rule-based mechanisms to complete the task. Accuracy for 
novel items was not different from accuracy for repeat items presented during testing suggesting 
that participants in both groups relied heavily on rule-based categorization strategies rather than 
item specific memory of the stimuli. The improved performance for visual cues versus temporal 
cues for the implicit group combined with the null result between novel and repeat items 
demonstrates that the implicit group strived to construct a rule for completing the task and did 
not rely on other memory systems.  
The results of Experiment 1 suggested that the visual cues used to prevent the 
verbalizability of the time-based rule were too distracting for participants in the implicit group to 
learn the time-based cue, implicitly or explicitly. For Experiment 2 we decided to increase the 
length of the longer duration from 3.33s to 5.01s to make the intervals more discriminable.  As 




Participants in the implicit group do not attend to time, because we have not told them to, and the 
similarity of the two target times may make it difficult to differentiate two times. We hoped that 
the increased difference between the short and long target times would enable the implicit group 




Participants: Thirty-seven participants (mean age 19.03(2.6)) participated in the study for 
course credit. Their average age (standard deviation) was 19.03 (2.6). Nineteen participants were 
randomly assigned to the explicit group (18 female, 1 male) and 18 to the implicit group (all 
female). Participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment.  
Procedure and Materials:  The only difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was that the 
target time used as a predictor for the police hat was increased from 3.33s to 5.00s. The target 
time used to predict the baseball cap remained at 1.67s. During the testing phase, there were 5 
different comparison times: 2.23s, 2.78s, 3.34s, 3.89s, and 4.45s. All other events and stimuli in 
Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1.  
Data Analysis:  All data was calculated and analyzed identically to Experiment 1. Only 3 
out of the 18 participants in the implicit group reported awareness of the differences in 
presentation duration on the post-test questionnaire and therefore, analysis assessing the 









Figure 12:  Percent correct for each cue/group relationship across blocks presented during 
training in Experiment 2. Error bars are standard error. 
 
Training: There was a significant cue by block by group interaction (F(4,140) = 4.62, p < .01), 
demonstrated in Figure 12. For the implicit group there was a significant cue by block interaction 
(F(4,68) = 3.08, p < .05). Accuracy increased over blocks for the visual cues, but not for the 
temporal cues. For the explicit group this interaction was marginally significant (F(4,72) = 2.45, 
p = 0.054). As in Experiment 1, accuracy for the temporal cues for the explicit group increased 
during training (F(4,72) = 10.21, p < .001). Overall, there was also a significant cue by group 
interaction (F(1,35) = 9.98, p < .01). Accuracy increased as across blocks (F(4,140) = 13.84, p < 
.001). Accuracy scores were higher for the explicit group than the implicit group (F(1,35) = 
184.93, p < .001) and accuracy scores were also higher for the visual cues stimuli than for the 




RTs significantly decreased over the blocks of trials (F(4,140) = 48.69, p < .001). There 
was also a significant block by group interaction (F(4,140) = 3.84, p < .01). As can be seen in 
Table 9, RTs decreased substantially more for the explicit group than for the implicit group as 
the training session progressed. There were no other significant effects of RTs.  This is a 
deviation from Experiment 1 in which there were no differences between the two groups.  
 
  Training  
Group  Block 1  Block 2  Block 3  Block 4  Block 5 
Explicit  1.64 (0.12)  0.84 (0.09)  0.71 (0.06)  0.64 (0.07)  0.62 (0.07) 
Implicit  1.39 (0.12)  0.86 (0.09)  0.79 (0.07)  0.84 (0.07)  0.84 (0.07) 
 
Table 9: Means (standard deviations) of reaction times at each block for each group in 
Experiment 2. 
 
Testing: There was a significant cue by group interaction for accuracy (F(1,35)=58.31, p< .001). 
As demonstrated in Figure 13, participants in the implicit group performed similarly to the 
explicit group when the hat choice was predicted by visual cues only (F(1,35)=2.42, p > .12), but 
performed much worse when hat choice was predicted by temporal cues (F(1,35)=132.80, p< 
.001). The overall ANOVA showed that participants were more accurate when presented with 
the visually predictive cues than with the temporally predictive cues (F(1,35)=50.95, p < .001). 
The explicit group was significantly more accurate than the implicit group (F(1,35)= 56.86, p < 
.001). There were no significant effects of novelty (main: F(1,35)<1), suggesting that episodic 





Figure 13: Percent correct for explicit and implicit groups for stimuli that contained visually 
predictive cues (Visual) or combined visual and temporal cues (Temporal) for the testing phase 
of Experiment 2. There was a significant difference between groups for the  temporal cues, but 
not the visual cues. Error bars are standard error. 
 
There were no significant effects of RTs. Participants responded at a similar rate 
regardless of stimulus predictor or group membership, which demonstrated a deviation from the 
three-way interaction (cue by novelty by group) from Experiment 1. 
There was a significant target time by group interaction for the probability of responding 
long (F(6,210)=61.586, p < .001; Fig. 14). The P(L) significantly increased as the presentation 
duration increased for the explicit group (F(6,108)=93.36, p < .001), but not for the implicit 
group (F(6,102)=1.24, p > .29). There was also a main effect of P(L) (F(6,210)=61.59, p < .001), 




Two participants from the implicit group did not provide verbal estimates on the post-test 
questionnaire so that the analysis contained 16 participants in the implicit group. There was a 
main effect of hat (F(1,33) = 25.73, p < .001) and significant hat by group interaction (F(1,33) = 
8.73, p < .01). Verbal estimates for the police hat were significantly higher than for the baseball 
cap for the explicit group (F(1,18) = 82.13, p < .001), but there was no effect of hat for the 
implicit group (F(1,15) = 1.23, p > .2; Table 10).  
 
 
Figure 14:  Probability of responding police hat (long, 5.00s) for the explicit and implicit groups 








Group  Police Hat  Baseball Cap 
Explicit  4.87 (1.03)  2.74 (0.92)  
Implicit  3.81 (2.71)   3.25 (1.48)  
 
Table 10:  Means (standard deviations) of the verbal estimates of the presentation duration of 
Mr. Potato Head™ in his respective hat (police hat or baseball cap) provided in a post-test 
questionnaire from Experiment 2.  
 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment replicated the previous experiment with few deviations. 
The increased discriminability of the intervals caused no major differences in the overall results 
for either group.  Specifically, the larger range for the two target times did not improve 
performance on the temporal cues for the implicit group. Since we incorporated visual cues into 
the task to serve as distracters from the temporal cue with the intention of creating a situation in 
which temporal information would be used to predict hat choice implicitly, we decided to use the 
visual cues as distracters only. 
In this final experiment, we follow the same procedure with the same set of stimuli, 
except that the predictor for hat choice is the presentation duration only, i.e. the temporal cue. 
Visual cues are no longer relevant and are presented equally across the two presentation 
durations. Therefore, the visual cues serve as distracters, but do not also serve as a solution for 









Participants: Twenty participants participated for course credit. Their average age (and 
standard deviation) was 19.5 (1.85). Ten were randomly assigned to the explicit group (7 female, 
3 male) and ten were assigned to the implicit group (9 female, 1 male). Participants were naïve to 
the purpose of the experiment.  
Materials: Half of the images used in the previous experiments were used in Experiment 
3 because not all images of Mr. Potato Head™ without a hat had an accompanying image of Mr. 
Potato Head™ in both hats. To pilot this study, we used the images of Mr. Potato Head™ 
without a hat if we also had the same images of Mr. Potato Head™ in both hats. Visual features 
were irrelevant and predicted hat choice 50% of the time.  
Procedure: There were fewer exemplars, so we included more blocks in training. Instead 
of 5 blocks of 16 exemplars (as in the previous experiments), there were 9 blocks of 8 exemplars 
in training. The other events of the trials in the training phase were the same as discussed in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Target times were 1.67s and 3.33s for the baseball cap and police hat 
respectively, the same targets used in Experiment 1. Images were presented for the same 7 target 
times during testing as in Experiment 1 (1.67s, 3.33s, and 1.95s, 2.33s, 2.50s, 2.78s, and 3.05s). 
Each target time was presented 14 times and randomly assigned to the 16 exemplars.  
Data Analysis:  The same measures were calculated as in Experiment 1. For training, 
percent correct and RTs were submitted to separate 9 (block) by 2 (group) ANOVAs with group 
as the between subjects factor. For testing, percent correct and RTs were calculated for trials in 
which one of the two standard target times (1.67s & 3.33s) was presented. These measures were 




(P(L)) was calculated for all trials at testing and submitted to a 2 (new, repeat) by 7 (target time) 
by 2 (group) ANOVA. One participant from the implicit group failed to provide verbal estimates 
of the presentation duration of each hat type in a post-test questionnaire. The provided verbal 
estimates were submitted to a 2 (hat) by 2 (group) ANOVA. Six out of the 10 participants in the 
implicit group self-reported noticing differences in presentation duration. However, because the 




Figure 15:  Percent correct for each group across blocks presented during training. Time was 
the only predictive cue in Experiment 3. Error bars are standard error. 
 
Training: Accuracy increased as training progressed (F(8,144) = 2.31, p < .05). The explicit 
group was significantly more accurate than the implicit group (F(1,18) = 198.00, p < .001). 




not a significant block by group interaction (F(8,144) = 1.05, p > .39). RTs tended to decrease as 
training progressed (F(8,144) = 27.64, p < .001). RTs were also faster for the explicit group than 




Figure 16:  Probability of responding police hat (long, 3.33s) for the explicit and implicit groups 
for the target times (1.67s & 3.33s) and the comparison times in Experiment 3. Error bars are 
standard error. 
 
Testing: As in the previous experiments, the explicit group was significantly more accurate than 
the implicit group (F(1,18) = 64.82, p < .001). There was no difference in accuracy for new and 
repeat items (F(1,18) = 1.34, p > .26). The explicit group responded significantly faster than the 
implicit group (F(1,18) = 9.26, p < .01), and there were no other significant effects of RTs. The 




< .001). There was also a significant group by target time interaction (F(6,108) = 19.01, p < 
.001). The P(L) increased with increasing target time for the explicit group (F(6,54) = 49.63, p < 
.001), but this was not the case with the implicit group (F(6,54) < 1; Fig. 16). There were no 
other significant effects for P(L).  
All participants provided larger verbal estimates for the police hat than for the baseball 
cap (F(1,17) = 29.41, p < .001). There was no difference between the groups (F(1,17) = 1.65, p > 
.2) and no significant group by hat interaction (F(1,17) = 1.34, p > .2; Table 11).  
 
Group  Police Hat  Baseball Cap 
Explicit  4.05 (0.86)   2.25 (0.54)  
Implicit  3.28 (1.56)   2.11 (0.65)  
 
Table 11:  Means (standard deviations) of the verbal estimates of the presentation duration of 
Mr. Potato Head™ in his respective hat (police hat or baseball cap) provided in a post-test 
questionnaire from Experiment 3.  
 
Discussion 
The final experiment differed from the previous two in that presentation duration was the 
only predictor of hat choice. The visual cues were used as distracters to prevent participants in 
the implicit group from forming rules about the predictor of hat choice. As in the previous two 
experiments, participants in the implicit group were not able to accurately perform the 
categorization task. However, when asked about the duration presentation of each hat, they were 





In this case, the verbal estimates are an example of retrospective timing. After the task 
participants were asked to provide temporal estimates of the presentation duration of each hat. 
Since the manner of collecting this measure makes time explicit, it is unlikely that the temporal 
information was learned implicitly. Retrospective timing is thought to rely on memory of the 
events that took place during the interval to be timed (Block, 1992). In fact, the reliance on 
memory for events for retrospective timing is so strong that when more events are included in an 
interval it is estimated as longer than when fewer events are included in the same interval (Hicks, 
et al, 1976; Zakay & Block, 2004). What is interesting about the current experiment is that the 
experimental events for the presentation of the two different hats were identical except for the 
difference in target time. It is possible that internal mental events occurring during the 
experiment could be utilized by participants to reconstruct the duration retrospectively. We 
assume that task related mental processes are relatively similar for the two hat presentations, 
however, the longer presentation duration would allow for more mental processes. Therefore, it 
is difficult to assume that the mechanisms typically involved in retrospective timing tasks were 
used in this task.  
Likewise, it is equally valid to speculate that their performance on verbal estimates was 
based on implicit learning of the target times.  It is possible that participants in the implicit group 
were able to implicitly learn the target times and utilize that information when explicitly 
required, but they did not extend that information to the categorization task. This is consistent 
with the idea, supported by the previous experiments, that performing a categorization task of 
this type using temporal information is more difficult for participants.  






Overall, participants in the implicit group were unable to categorize Mr. Potato Head’s™ 
hat choice using temporal information. However, when temporal information was the only 
predictor for hat choice, participants in the implicit group were able to differentiate the durations 
when giving retrospective verbal estimates of the time each hat was presented for. This likely 
didn’t happen when time was not the only predictor for hat choice because participants were 
heavily focused on the relationship between the visual stimuli and predicting hat choice and there 
was positive feedback that visual cues were important to the task. The intense focus on visual 
cues may have prevented any level of encoding (implicit or otherwise) of other elements of the 
trials, such as duration presentation. The visual stimuli were included as a means of distracting 
participants from time to prevent them from creating a verbal rule using duration. However, it 
seems that because we commonly think of categories as being constructed out of visual cues and 
Mr. Potato Head™ is a toy that is constructed out of visual parts, participants may have been too 
distracted by the visual cues to utilize other elements of the trials.  We had anticipated that the 
visual features would dominate perceptual awareness, but we’d hoped that these cues would have 
served as distracters from the temporal domain, but not be so distracting as to prevent all forms 
of learning of temporal information for participants in the implicit group.  
Still, the fact that groups did not differ in their verbal estimates in Experiment 3 is very 
intriguing.  Verbal estimates given by the implicit group were the same for the two hat types in 
the first two experiments when both visual and temporal cues were used, but the implicit group 
was able to retrospectively differentiate presentation duration of the two hats when the visual 
cues were not predictors of hat choice. Typically, in retrospective timing tasks, participants use 




lasted (Block, 1992). The more events included during the interval to be retrospectively timed, 
the longer estimates are (Hicks, et al, 1976; Zakay & Block, 2004). However, the events in the 
two trials were identical, except for presentation duration. This makes it difficult to assume that 
participants made their estimates using the same memory mechanisms used in other retrospective 
timing tasks. It is also possible that participants in the implicit group learned the two presentation 
durations implicitly, but did not apply that information to the categorization task, until explicitly 
asked to do so. This didn’t happen in the first two experiments because visual information 
allowed them to solve the task some of the time. When that cue was removed from the 
experiment, participants were able to learn more about the events of the trials, hence they may 
have learned the times implicitly, but they did not use that information to categorize hat choice. 
Alterations in the event structure during the trials could help clarify if the temporal information 
was learned implicitly and not used in categorization, or if the information was reconstructed 
from event based information in memory. By embedding trials with different numbers of events 
into the experiment, such as beeps of sound that could be used as a mental architecture for 
recalling the duration, we could replicate the retrospective phenomenon showing that more 
events during the trial led to increased estimates, thereby supporting the use of retrospective 
memory for recalling the durations in the current experiment. In contrast, if this effect is not 
found, we may assume that without other predictive cues, time was learned implicitly but not 
used.  
It is possible that the stimulus we chose was not the most conducive to categorization by 
combining the modalities of vision and time. There were no differences between new and repeat 
stimuli for any measure at testing which implies that participants were heavily focused on 




for effective categorization. In contrast, the Allen & Brooks (1991) study that these experiments 
were partially based on, showed that participants relied on episodic memory for categorizing 
repeat stimuli. The fact that our participants did not utilize episodic memory for repeat stimuli 
implies that the features of our stimuli were not sufficiently integrated as a unified whole. 
Participants in the explicit group relied on the rules rather than their memory of the stimuli. 
Participants in the implicit group relied on rules for the visual cues and tried to create a rule for 
the temporal cues rather than rely on their memory of the stimuli. The conglomeration of features 
of Mr. Potato Head™ create well integrated stimuli (Shohamy, et al, 2004), however, the 
inclusion of the temporal domain may have diminished the perceptibility of wholeness. 
Integrated stimuli are important for categorization, although they are not necessarily important 
for implicit learning, but this may explain why both groups relied on rule-based strategies. This 
may also explain why temporal information, if learned implicitly in Experiment 3, was not used 
to categorize items. A more integrated stimulus might have allowed for effective categorization 
in the implicit group. The existing task could be modified to use visual, auditory, and temporal 
information. For example, participants could be told that they need to categorize the significance 
of calls produced by artificially created animals and be presented with different types of 
artificially constructed animals making different types of sounds for different lengths of time. 
This would create a categorization task that crosses 3 modalities (visual, auditory, and temporal), 
increasing the likelihood that there would be multi-modal integration in categorization. This 
potential experiment also uses a real-world analogy which may be more straight forward than 
how long one takes to get ready, as was used in the current studies. 
Additionally, the implicit learning of time could be explored using probabilistic tasks, as 




(Shohamy, et al, 2004; Shohamy, et al, 2008). For example, target time a may predict category A 
with a .8 probability, whereas target time b may predict category A with a .2 probability, with 
target times in between predicting the outcome with probabilities in between. Some additional 
sensory modality must be used to present the temporal information. If using the auditory 
modality, the auditory stimuli would also have a specified probability structure. In such a task, it 
would be possible to inform participants of the relevance of duration, just as participants are told 
to pay attention to the features of Mr. Potato Head™ or the Weather Prediction cards. However, 
having explicit knowledge of the importance of time would not enable participants to complete 
the probabilistic structure of the task explicitly. Participants would likely respond based on the 
probabilities but not have explicit knowledge of what motivates their responses. 
In conclusion, these studies have provided insight into the importance of understanding 
how different types of memory may affect our learning, recognition, and recall of durations of 
time. These studies show that creating categories does not occur implicitly across perceptual 
domains, especially when one of the domains (vision) dominates the other (time). Furthermore, 
when feedback indicates that visual cues will predict the outcome some of the time, nothing else 
is learned implicitly about the trials. In contrast, when visual cues do not predict the outcome, 
temporal information about the trials is learned, but not used to complete the categorization task, 










In the three chapters we demonstrated the importance of understanding temporal 
perception across memory systems. In the first chapter, Working Memory for Time, we 
presented two experiments with increasing delay periods inserted into a timing reproduction task 
between presentation and reproduction. A roving referent paradigm was used to target working 
memory processes involved in timing. A millisecond (ms) and supra-second (ss) target time were 
compared. The ms target time was overestimated and ss target time was underestimated, 
however, estimates of both target times increased with increasing delay period. In Experiment 1 
we proposed that the delay period interfered with the memory representation of the target time 
and in Experiment 2 we demonstrated that the amount of interference depended on the 
proportional relationship between the delay period and the target time. SET (scalar expectancy 
theory) was used to explain this interference effect. Some amount of temporal information 
accumulated during the delay period even though it was an irrelevant duration and this additional 
accumulation was added to the working memory representation of the target time leading to 
longer estimates. The primary contribution of this study demonstrated that the time period 
between duration presentation and reproduction systematically interferes with the working 
memory representation of the target time by causing it to increase.  
This is different from previous work demonstrating subjective shortening after delay 
periods in discrimination tasks and suggests that task type plays an important role in 
understanding memory processes. Discrimination timing tasks and reproduction timing tasks are 
analogous to recognition and recall memory tasks discussed in the non-temporal domain. Recall 
memory tasks are assumed to require more processing resources because participants must 




tasks. Research has suggested that different timing tasks do not always yield the same results 
(Allan, 1979; Bangert, et al, 2011; Jones, et al. 2008). Distinguishing reproduction and 
discrimination timing tasks as recall and recognition tasks retrospectively, helps to explain why 
there are differences and points to the importance of approaching an understanding of time 
perception by utilizing what is understood about non-temporal memory.  
In the second chapter, Memory of Multiple Time Intervals, we presented three 
experiments with a delay-causing distracter task between a block of training trials and a block of 
testing trials of a reproduction task. In the first two experiments participants learned three ss 
target times, all of which were underestimated with respect to the target time. However, 
estimates were less underestimated for the shortest target time than the longest target time 
providing evidence for Vierordt-like migration effects. A similar effect was found for the third 
experiment using ms target times. The two shorter target times were overestimated, as would be 
expected for ms target times, and the longest was underestimated.  
One of the primary contributions of the three experiments from chapter 2 comes from the 
training block showing that the migration effect commonly referred to as Vierordt’s law is 
independent from the respective overestimation and underestimation of ms and ss target times. It 
is likely that the context of learning multiple target times together caused participants to organize 
the presentations into a category and that this mental organization caused the memory 
representations of the target times to drift towards each other. This was corroborated in 
Experiment 2 when another target time was presented during a retraining phase using the same 
cue. Participants kept the memory representation of the group of intervals presented at training 
independent from the retraining target time. This unique understanding of the mechanism 




task. Interestingly, after a delay of a few minutes, the Vierordt-like migration effect diminished 
and was replaced by an increase in estimates.  This could mean that the migration effect is 
related to encoding processes instead of long-term memory storage. However, the ms target 
times migrated at a later recall.  This may be another distinction  underlying the two time ranges.  
The overestimation of ms target times and the underestimation of ss target times, as well 
as Vierordt-like effects, are not accounted for in SET. Typically, it is assumed that estimates of 
time are veridical with actual time (e.g. Wearden, 2003) and both of these phenomena contradict 
that assumption. It is difficult to reconcile the overestimation of ms target times and 
underestimation of ss target times with the veridical nature of time estimates proposed by SET. 
However, Vierordt’s law need not be contradictory to SET. If it is assumed that Vierordt-like 
migration effects arise due to categorization of multiple target times when learned together, this 
would qualify a difference between learning time intervals in isolation and in a group. This 
means that estimates are veridical to actual time when learned in isolation, but not when learned 
in a group.  
Another main contribution of these experiments was that the scalar property of interval 
timing became evident during the later testing block, suggesting that the scalar property derives 
from retrieval processes. In SET the internal clock emits pulses following a Poisson distribution, 
so as estimates increase they would not remain scalar (Gibbon, 1992; Staddon & Higa, 1999). 
Therefore, it has been argued that the scalar property arises from memory or decision processes 
(Gibbon, 1992; Gibbon & Church, 1984). However, this has been difficult to verify. The results 
from chapter two effectively isolate later retrieval from encoding processes and the scalar 




provides evidence that the scalar property arises from memory processes and specifically from 
the retrieval phase of memory.  
In the third and final chapter, Implicit and Explicit Timing, three experiments attempted 
to target the implicit learning of temporal information by presenting images of a Mr. Potato 
Head™ figure and requiring participants to predict one of two outcomes. Half of the participants 
were told the relationship between the predictors and the outcomes (explicit group), while the 
other half were not given this information, and were expected to learn it through observation 
with feedback (implicit group). The distinction between implicit and explicit memory is not 
made in SET. For this reason, we felt it was important to understand if time perception was 
similar to or different from other types of perceptual domains that can be learned using implicit 
paradigms. In the first two experiments both visual and temporal cues served as outcome 
predictors and we assumed that this combination of cues would make it difficult for the implicit 
group to explicitly learn the relationship between the temporal predictor and the outcomes. 
Instead, we found that the implicit group was able to learn the relationship only when visual cues 
predicted the outcome, but not when temporal cues predicted the outcome. In Experiment 3, 
temporal information was the only predictor. The implicit group was not able to use this 
information to successfully predict hat choice, but when asked afterwards how long they thought 
the presentation durations were, their estimates matched those given by the explicit group, even 
though this didn’t happen with the first two experiments. Isolating time as the only feature gave 
participants in the implicit group sufficient information to learn the different presentation 
durations, even though they didn’t use that information for categorization. Future work should 
explore how the explicitly elicited estimate given by the implicit group was encoded.  They may 




used retrospective timing memory to recall the different presentation durations, but that doesn’t 
completely account for why they were unable to do this for the first two experiments.  
Combined, these separate studies demonstrate that there are a variety of methods for 
productive experimental exploration using what we understand from memory research and 
applying that information to the temporal domain. Although these separate chapters target very 
distinct memory systems, there are a few ways in which the results relate. At the end of chapter 1 
(Working Memory for Time) we described that the overestimation and underestimation of ms 
and ss target times respectively could be an example of Vierordt’s law, instead of evidence that 
the two target ranges are processed differently. In chapter 1, because the delay affected the two 
target times similarly (estimates for both increased with increasing delay length), we thought this 
could be evidence that the two target ranges (ms & ss) were not processed differently, and as an 
alternative explanation, we suggested that the overestimation of ms target times and the 
underestimation of ss target times were evidence of Vierordt’s law. However, in chapter 2 
(Memory of Multiple Time Intervals), we demonstrated that ms target times are overestimated 
and adhere to the Vierordt-like migration effect and that ss target times are underestimated and 
also adhere to the migration effect definitively showing that these effects are distinct.  
Throughout chapters 1 and 2 we also speculated that the overestimation of ms target 
times could be a result of the reproduction task. Wearden (2003) demonstrates how both the 
overestimation of ms target times and the underestimation of ss target times could be achieved 
with one mechanism. When participants are going to make a temporal estimate, the amount of 
accumulating information must reach a specific criterion prior to initiating a response, according 
to SET. When that criterion is met, a response is initiated. Following Wearden’s (2003) example, 




target time is 500ms, participants will initiate a response when 300ms has elapsed, and after 
adding the response time, the final estimate will be 600ms, which is larger than the target time. 
In contrast, if the target time is 1200ms, the response will be initiated at 720ms, and with the 
reaction time included, the final estimate will be 1020ms; smaller than the target time. While this 
accounts for the data at short ss intervals, it does not account for it when ss target times are 
larger. For example, if the target time is 10s, then the response would be initiated at 6s and the 
final estimate would be 6.3s. We can easily see from chapter 2 that the underestimation of the 
larger ss target times is not so extreme. For this to hold, we must assume that the response 
criterion changes for larger ss target times.  
 A more parsimonious explanation would be that clock mechanisms for the two target 
ranges differ, resulting in the contrasting overestimation and underestimation of the target 
ranges, while working memory mechanisms for the two ranges do not differ, resulting in 
increases in estimates across the target ranges found in chapter 1. This explanation is supported 
by neuroimaging findings that show activation in parietal and frontal regions, areas related to 
working memory, for both target ranges (Macar & Vidal, 2009). 
 The migration effect found in chapter 2 when multiple target times are learned together is 
not a unique finding (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009), but some argue that it is a result of the 
reproduction task following the same logic above (Wearden, 2003).  However, there is evidence 
of Vierordt’s law from verbal estimation tasks (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009), although these tasks 
tended to include ms and ss target times, confounding if the effect was due to migration or 
differences in how these ranges are processed.  We argue that the migration is a result of multiple 
target times being learned together, independent of the target ranges being presented, and that 




reproduction task easily allows for the presentation of multiple intervals, because estimates are 
typically made immediately after presentation, as seen in chapter 1. In contrast, with 
discrimination tasks, participants learn one or two standards, where the two standards are 
presented relative to each other (e.g. one is short, and one is long) and are then presented with a 
number of comparison durations. Migration effects wouldn’t be predicted when there is only one 
standard target time and have not been assessed when two standards are presented in a 
discrimination task. Theoretically, the comparator times used in the discrimination task could 
influence the memory representation of the standard, if participants are categorizing them 
together. The common use of multiple target times in the reproduction task would explain why 
Vierordt’s law tends to be reported more often in reproduction tasks.  
However, discrimination tasks could be used to test for the Vierordt-like migration 
effects by utilizing the shape-target time association we developed in chapter 2. For example, 
three different standard times would be presented, each associated with a specific shape. 
Comparison times would be presented with the shape that corresponded to the target time that 
participants should make the comparison to. Comparison gradients would be compared across 
conditions in which a single standard time was learned with conditions in which multiple 
standard times were learned. Additionally, changing the range and quantity of comparators could 
also influence the memory representation of the standard, providing evidence that intervals 
presented together influence the memory representation of each other, which we argue is the 
mechanism underlying Vierordt’s law.  
 In chapter 3 (Implicit and Explicit Timing) we designed a paradigm to target the implicit 
learning of time, and found that the design allowed for temporal estimates of target times when 




retrospective timing mechanisms, then this task could be used to study retrospective timing 
further. Typically, retrospective judgments are obtained after participants complete an unrelated 
task. One of the reasons that retrospective timing has been relatively less studied than 
prospective timing is because of the difficulty of obtaining estimates for different target times 
from the same participants, because once a single judgment has been requested participants are 
aware of the relevance of the temporal domain. Grondin & Plourde (2007) were able to get 
multiple estimates from a single participant by requiring participants to complete different tasks 
for different target times and give retrospective timing judgments when all the tasks were 
completed. A unique aspect to our design is that we were able to obtain multiple estimates from a 
single participant, while the participant completed the same task, categorizing Mr. Potato 
Head™, for both target times.  Additionally, our task allowed us to use shorter target times than 
is typical in retrospective tasks. In order to give participants time to complete the non-timing 
task, studied durations tend to be in the minutes range (e.g. 2-4 min for Grondin & Plourde, 
2007).  Our task allowed us to assess estimates for 1.67s and 3.33s. This task could potentially be 
used to assess even shorter target times (e.g. ms) to see if there are range differences in 
retrospective timing. Finally, we could incorporate a long delay between the categorization phase 
and the retrospective judgments, perhaps filled with a distracter task shown not to interfere with 
timing, to see how retrospective estimates may change at a later recall. 
 An alternate explanation is that the presentation durations were learned implicitly, but not 
used to complete the categorization task. Therefore, participants could use the implicitly learned 
memories to give estimates after the task.  Future experiments should focus on isolating the 
implicit learning of time. A potential experiment could use a more realistic example that would 




they need to categorize the significance of calls produced by artificially created animals and be 
presented with different types of artificially constructed animals making different types of 
sounds for different lengths of time. This would allow for multi-modal categorization (across the 
visual, auditory, and temporal domains), and has a straightforward real world analogy that would 
increase the likelihood that participants would use the implicitly learned information to complete 
the task.  
 In conclusion, these three chapters have demonstrated a number of important findings. 
Task type is very important for understanding different memory systems in time perception. 
Discrimination tasks do not facilitate an understanding of the mechanisms underlying Vierordt’s 
law the way a reproduction task does because discrimination tasks do not require participants to 
learn multiple time intervals simultaneously. Discrimination tasks demonstrate subjective 
shortening but reproduction tasks demonstrate lengthening when working memory processes are 
targeted, likely because these tasks are analogous to recognition and recall tasks found in non-
temporal memory studies. These studies have also shown that differences in processing ms and 
ss target times lead to differences in estimates, but these differences are independent from effects 
of working memory. Estimates for both target ranges will increase with an increasing delay, even 
though ms target times are consistently overestimated and ss target times are consistently 
underestimated. Additionally the overestimation of ms target times and the underestimation of ss 
target times is independent of migration effects found when multiple target times are learned 
together. Finally, the last study, showed us that participants can learn a duration implicitly, but 
do not apply that information to the categorization task.  In general, these three chapters have 
demonstrated that many of the approaches used to understand different memory systems can be 
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